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COMPROMISING LIBERTY: A STRUCTURAL CRITIQUE
OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Jackie Gardina*
This Article contends that the federal sentencing guidelines-whether mandatory or
discretionary-violate the constitutional separation of powers by impermissibly inter-
fering with a criminal jury's constitutional duty to act as a check against
government overreaching. This Article posits that the inclusion of the criminal jury
in Article III of the Constitution was intended as an inseparable element of the con-
stitutional system of checks and balances. This Article also submits a proposal for
restoring the constitutional balance through the creation of a "guideline jury system"
within the current guideline structure. The implementation of a guideline jury sys-
tem would fill the constitutional void created by the current sentencing regime
without destroying its underlying benefits. By making the jury a larger part of the
guideline structure, the sentencing guidelines would no longer violate the separation
of powers and the criminal jury would be reinstated as a viable check against gov-
ernment overreaching.
In Part I, this Article examines the Supreme Court's recent decision in United
States v. Booker, specifically how the Court lost an opportunity to restore the jury to
its rightful place in our tripartite system of government. By pronouncing the sentenc-
ing guidelines discretionary instead of mandatory, the Court simply transferred
unchecked power from the hands of the prosecutor to the hands of the federal bench.
In Part II, this Article illustrates how the sentencing guidelines interfere with the
jury's constitutional role by systematically discouraging a criminal defendant from
asserting her right to a jury trial. While most case law and guideline critiques focus
on the sentencing factors that increase a criminal defendant's sentence, this Article
focuses on the guideline mechanisms that decrease the sentence. Criminal defen-
dants are routinely waiving their right to a jury trial based on these incentives. In
Part III, this Article discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Patton v. United
States where the Court made the unsupported declaration that Article III and the
Sixth Amendment were to be read in pai materia. This Article contends that the
Framers included the jury in Article Ifl as a structural check against untrustworthy
federal judges and overreaching by the Legislative and Executive Branches. Finally,
in Part T, this Article submits a proposal for restoring the constitutional balance. It
contends that the equilibrium can be restored through the creation of a "guideline
jury system" within the current guideline structure. By making the jury a larger part
of the guideline structure the criminal jury, albeit in a different form, would be re-
instated as a meaningful part of the constitutional sytem of checks and balances.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I would like to thank Bruce
Duthu, Cheryl Hanna, Peter Teachout, Pam Stephens, Laura Gillen, and Doug Berman for
their insights and patience as well as Will Senning for his excellent research skills and com-
ments. In addition, I want to extend a special thanks to Lauren Bassing without whom
misplaced modifiers would abound.
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INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Booker' the Supreme Court had the opportunity
to re-establish the jury as a necessary component of the criminal
justice process. Although a portion of the majority opinion paid lip
service to the critical importance of the jury in our system of gov-
ernment,2 in the end, the jury became a victim to the power
struggle between the judicial and legislative branches of the gov-
ernment. It is ironic that in the same opinion where the Court
extolled the jury as the guardian "against a spirit of oppression and
tyranny on the part of rulers" and the protector of the "great bul-
wark of [our] civil and political liberties," it rendered powerless the
jury's ability to fulfill that role.'
The Booker decision came in the wake of the Court's decision in
Blakely v. Washington.4 In Blakely, the Supreme Court extended the
scope of the Sixth Amendment to certain aspects of the Washington
State sentencing scheme, holding that "every defendant has the
right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally es-
sential to the punishment."5 Although it dealt with a state sentencing
scheme, its applicability to the federal sentencing guidelines was
immediately questioned.6 To answer that question and calm the re-
sulting chaos in the federal system, the Court expedited the appeals
in Booker. The Booker Court concluded that its holding in Blakely was
applicable to the federal sentencing guidelines.7 To remedy the
Sixth Amendment violation, a majority of the Court made the sen-
tencing guidelines discretionary instead of mandatory, thereby
removing the guidelines from the scope of the Sixth Amendment.
8
Somewhat lost in the chaos following Blakely was the fact that the
decision raised important questions regarding the role of the jury
in our criminal justice system. The majority premised the outcome
in Blakely on the importance of the criminal jury to the constitu-
tional structure.9 Yet what was conspicuously absent from
1. 125 S. Ct. 738; 2005 U.S. LEXIS 628 (2005).
2. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 753.
3. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000)).
4. 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
5. Id. at 2543.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Mueffieman, 327 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.Mass. 2004); United
States v. Agett, 327 F.Supp.2d 899 (E.D.Tenn. 2004); United States v. King, 326 F.Supp.2d
1276 (M.D.Fla. 2004); United States v. Harris, 325 F.Supp.2d 562 (W.D.Pa. 2004); United
States v. Croxford, 324 F.Supp.2d 1230 D. Utah 2004).
7. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
8. Id.
9. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538-39.
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post-Blakely discussions about the continued viability of the federal
sentencing guidelines and the future of sentencing reform was any
substantive discussion of how the criminal jury can be restored to
its prominent position in the Judicial Branch. Booker provided the
Court with the opportunity to address this issue. Unfortunately,
despite its rhetoric regarding the role of the jury,'I the Booker deci-
sion neglects to provide any measure of protection for that role.
The Framers included the criminal jury in the constitutional de-
sign as part of an elaborate system of checks and balances." It was
not deemed a mere procedural formality, nor was it simply an indi-
vidual right of the accused. 2 In the eyes of the Framers, the
criminal jury provided the citizens an important role in the ad-
ministration of the laws. 3 As Justice Scalia stated in Blakely, "j]ust
as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative
and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control
in the judiciary.'' 4 The criminal jury was intended to provide both
an intra-branch check against the arbitrary actions of federal
judges and an inter-branch check against the oppressive conduct of
the other two branches.15 The Booker majority appeared to recog-
nize this constitutional role but failed to provide an avenue
through which the jury could perform it.
Indeed the criminal jury's increasing marginalization is missing
from most structural critiques of the federal sentencing guidelines.
It is well documented that since the promulgation of the guide-
lines the use of criminal juries has steadily declined. 6 In 2002, less
than three percent of criminal defendants chose to exercise their
Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial. 7 A defendant's reluctance to
exercise her right to a jury can be linked directly to institutional
incentives imbedded in the federal sentencing guidelines encour-
aging waiver of constitutional rights.' Under the sentencing
guidelines, criminal defendants who waive the right to trial by jury
10. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 753.
11. See discussion infra Part III.A.
12. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
13. See id.
14. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2539 (citing Letter XV by the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788)
reprinted in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 315, 320 (H. Storing ed. 1981)).
15. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
16. See Judicial Conference of United States, Committee on Long Range Planning,
Long Range Plan for Federal Courts (1995) (citing the Sentencing Guidelines as the major fac-
tor bringing about more guilty pleas and fewer trials).
17. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING STATISTICS 20 (2004) [hereinafter 2002 SOURCEBOOK].
18. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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often incur significantly lower sentences.' 9 These defendants can
be assured, on average, a sentence that is 300 percent lower than
similarly situated defendants who exercise their Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury. °
Congress has created a sentencing regime that, in operation, in-
terferes with the jury's ability to check against government
overreaching. 2' The federal sentencing guidelines have eviscerated
the jury's role in our constitutional design by systematically dis-
couraging criminal defendants from asserting their right to a jury
trial.2 But because the majority of guideline critiques have focused
on the impact of sentencing enhancements on an individual's
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,23 scant attention has been
paid to the structural impact of the guideline factors that provide a
reduction in a defendant's sentence. Indeed, even after Booker,
Congress will be free to make factors that lead to sentence reduc-
tions mandatory because only mandatory sentence enhancements
implicate Sixth Amendment concerns. 4 Courts and commentators
have been lulled into accepting a sentencing regime that provides
significant sentence discounts to criminal defendants, in part, be-
cause sentence reductions are viewed as harmless. 5 But a branch's
19. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OFJUSTICE STATISTICS
64 (2000). The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that "the average prison term imposed on
defendants convicted at trial was longer than the term imposed on defendants convicted by
plea." Id. See also Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28
Am. CRIM. L. REv. 161, 176-177 (1991). Judge Heaney reported that under the sentencing
guidelines defendants who went to trial typically were sentenced to two-and-a-half more
years than defendants who pleaded guilty while under pre-guideline law, the sentencing
difference was one year and two months. Id.
20. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTIC 66 (2001) (reporting that drug offenders convicted at trial received an average of
203.8 months compared to the 68.7 months for drug offenders convicted by a guilty plea).
21. See discussion infra Part II.C.
22. See United States v. SpeedJoyeros, S.A., 204 F.Supp.2d 412, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
23. See generally Judge Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons
From Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 419 (1999); Andrew Neal Siegal,
The Sixth Amendment on Ice: United States v. Jones: Whether Sentencing Enhancements for Failure
to Plead Guilty Chill the Exercise of the Right to Trial, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 645 (1994); Brian P. Thill,
Prior "Convictions" Under Apprendi: Why Juvenile Adjudications May Not Be Used to Increase an
Offender's Sentence Exposure if They Have Not First Been Proven to a jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,
87 MARQ. L. REv. 573 (2004); Ethan Glass, Whatever Happened to the Trial ry Jury? The Uncon-
stitutionality of Upward Departures Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 37 GONZAGA L.
REV. 343 (2002).
24. The Booker remedial majority acknowledged that the "ball now lies in Congress'
court" to create a sentencing system compatible with the Constitution. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at
768.
25. Sentence reductions are deemed largely harmless as they relate to individual
rights. However, as the Feeney Amendment reveals, Congress takes reduced sentences very
seriously. See infta note 123.
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interference with the carefully contrived system of checks and bal-
ances has never been deemed harmless.26
This Article contends that the federal sentencing guidelines-
whether mandatory or discretionary--violate the separation of pow-
ers because they impermissibly interfere with the jury's
constitutionally assigned role as a check against government over-
reaching. In making this argument, this Article challenges the long-
standing constitutional principle that the reference to a trial by jury
in Article III is solely an individual right that can be waived by the
accused. In its stead, this Article posits that the inclusion of the
criminal jury in Article III was intended as an inseparable element
of the constitutional system of checks and balances. This challenge
necessarily questions the Supreme Court's declaration in Patton v.
United States 7 that the Sixth Amendment and Article III's trial pro-
211
visions are coterminous.
In Part I, this Article discusses the Court's recent decision in
Booker and how the Court lost an opportunity to re-establish the
jury to its rightful place in our tripartite system of government. By
pronouncing the sentencing guidelines discretionary instead of
mandatory, the Court simply transferred unchecked power from
the hands of the prosecutor to the hands of the federal bench.
In Part II, this Article illustrates how the sentencing guidelines
interfere with the jury's structural role by systematically discourag-
ing a criminal defendant from asserting her right to a jury trial.
While most case law and guideline critiques focus on the sentenc-
ing factors that increase a criminal defendant's sentence, this Article
focuses on the guideline mechanisms that decrease the sentence.
Criminal defendants are routinely waiving their right to ajury trial
based on these incentives. As a result, the criminal jury has all but
disappeared.
In Part III, this Article discusses the Supreme Court's decision in
Patton in which the Court made the unsupported declaration that
Article III and the Sixth Amendment were to be read in pali mate-
ria. This Article explains where the Court erred in both its legal
and historical analysis. While discussing Patton, this Article de-
scribes the structural role of the jury in the constitutional design.
Relying primarily on the historical research of Professor Akhil
Amar, this Article contends that the Framers included the jury in
26. See discussion infra Part III.D.
27. 281 U.S. 276 (1930), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Fla., 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
28. Id. at 298.
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Article III as a structural check against untrustworthy federal
judges as well as against overreaching by the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches. In addition, this Article distinguishes the criminal
jury in Article III from the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,
and explains how the two can coexist.
Finally, in Part IV, this Article submits a proposal for restoring
the constitutional balance. It contends that the equilibrium can be
restored through the creation of a "guideline jury system" within
the current guideline structure. The implementation of a guide-
line jury system would fill the constitutional void created by the
current sentencing regime without destroying its basic premise. By
making the jury a larger part of the guideline structure, the sen-
tencing guidelines would no longer violate the separation of
powers, and the criminal jury, albeit in a different form, would be
reinstated as a viable check against government overreaching.
I. BOOKER: LOST OPPORTUNITY
In his column following the Booker decision, Edward Lazarus
summed up the opinion in two contradictory, but nonetheless ac-
curate, statements: "The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are dead.
Long live the Federal Sentencing Guideline." 9 The Court in Booker
faced two interrelated questions.30 First, did the Sentencing Guide-
lines violate the Sixth Amendment by allowing the judge to
enhance a defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum
based on facts not found by ajury nor admitted by the defendant?31
Second, if the answer to the first question was "yes," were the sen-
tencing guidelines as a whole inapplicable, or could the offending
portions be severed?32 In a bizarre decision that contained two ma-
jority opinions, the Court answered yes to the first question, with
one majority holding that "any fact ... which is necessary to sup-
port a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum authorized by
the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to ajury beyond a reasonable
29. Edward Lazarus, The Supreme Court's Sentencing Guidelines Decision: Its Logic
and Its Surprisingly Limited Practical Effect, Writ: FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20050121.html (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform).





doubt. ' Another majority of the Court proceeded to sever the
portions of the Sentencing Reform Act that offended the Sixth
Amendment, making the guideline system advisory.34 What the
constitutional majority gave with one hand-a Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial-the remedial majority took away with the
other, holding that the guidelines were no longer mandatory and
thus outside the reach of the Sixth Amendment. Thus, the jury
remains in a strong sense a dispensable part of the criminal justice
system.
The Booker case required the Court to determine whether its
holding in Apprendi (that the Sixth Amendment required any fact
increasing the penalty for a crime above the statutory maximum to
be submitted to ajury or admitted by the defendant) and whether
its holding in Blakely (that the statutory maximum was the maxi-
mum sentence a judge may impose based on the facts found by a
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant) were applicable to the
federal sentencing guidelines. 5 In Booker, the jury convicted
Freddie Booker of possession with intent to distribute a cocaine
base after hearing evidence that he had 92.5 grams of cocaine in
his duffel bag 6 . Based on Booker's criminal history and the
amount of drugs found by the jury, the sentencing guidelines set a
maximum sentence of 21 years, 10 months.3 7 In a post-trial sen-
tencing proceeding, the judge concluded that Booker had
possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and that he was guilty
of obstructing justice. Because of these additional judge-made fac-
tual findings, Booker was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment.38
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the sentence violated the
Sixth Amendment and remanded with instructions to resentence
Booker within the sentencing range supported by the jury's find-
ings, or in the alternative to hold a separate sentencing hearing
before ajury3 9
The constitutional majority affirmed the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion and reaffirmed it holding in Apprendi.40 Its conclusion rested
on the premise that the relevant sentencing rules were mandatory
33. Id. at 745 (constitutional majority consisted ofJustice Stevens delivering the opin-
ion of the Court joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg).
34. Id.(remedial majority consisted of Justice Breyer delivering the opinion of the
Court joined by The ChiefJustice,Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg).
35. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.




40. Id. at 755-56.
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and imposed binding requirements on all sentencing judges.4 Ac-
cording to the constitutional majority, "[i]f the Guidelines as
currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions that
recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sen-
tences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not
implicate the Sixth Amendment. 42 The remedial majority used this
reasoning to fashion a remedy that makes the guidelines effectively
advisory. "We answer the question of remedy by finding that the pro-
visions of the federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines
mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004), incompatible with
today's constitutional holding. We conclude that this provision must
be severed and excised... ... 4 Under the new advisory system, a sen-
tencing court is required to "consider Guidelines ranges" but it also
permits the court "to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory
concerns as well."4 In addition, the remedial majority altered the
appellate standard of review, changing it from de novo to "reason-
able.4 5 In the end, the remedial majority recognized that theirs was
not the last word. "The ball now lies in Congress' court. The Na-
tional Legislature is equipped to devise an install, long-term, the
sentencing system compatible with the Constitution, that Congress
judges best for the federal system ofjustice"46
It is difficult to predict how the Booker decision will affect sen-
tencing in the federal courts. Shortly after the opinion was
released, two judges offered their sentencing approaches in the
wake of Booker. The day after Booker was released, Judge Cassell
issued an opinion in United States v. Wilson47 in which he stated that
he would continue to follow the Guidelines "in all but the most
exceptional cases."' A week laterJudge Adelman issued an opinion
criticizing Judge Cassell's approach. "The directives of Booker and
§ 3553(a) make clear that the courts may no longer uncritically
apply the guidelines and, as one court suggested, "only depart...
in unusual cases for clearly identified and persuasive reasons. 09
According to Judge Adelman, sentencing in a post-Booker world
"will be harder now than it was a few months ago. District courts
cannot just add up figures and pick a number within a narrow
range. Rather they must consider all of the applicable factors, lis-
41. Id. at 750.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 756-57.
44. Id. at 757.
45. Id. at 765.
46. Id. at 768.
47. 2005 WL 78552 (D.UtahJanuary 13, 2005).
48. Id.
49. United States v. Ranum, No. 04-CR-31, slip op. at 2 (E.D.Wisc.January 19, 2005).
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ten carefully to defense and government counsel, and sentence the
person before them as an individual."50
Although many questions remain unanswered, in the final analy-
sis Booker does little to "reform" the sentencing system or secure
the jury's role in our tripartite system of government. The Court
had an opportunity to establish the jury as an important compo-
nent of our constitutional system. Instead it created a sentencing
regime that shifted unchecked power from one branch to another.
While the Court acknowledged the essential and historical role of
the jury as a check against governmental oppression and tyranny, it
failed to allow the jury to act in that role. Indeed, the jury's role
was even further diminished by the Court's decision. What Booker
and the precedents on which it was built fail to acknowledge is that
the vanishing criminal jury is leaving a dangerous void in our tri-
partite system of government.
II. THE VANISHING CRIMINALJURY
As previously noted, over 97 percent of criminal defendants in
2002 waived their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to obtain
significantly lower sentences. 5' Congress has created a sentencing
system with enormous incentives to waive basic constitutional
rights. 2 Under the pre-Booker sentencing system, a criminal defen-
dant could cut his sentence in half by waiving his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial and its attendant constitutional
protections.53 It is these systemic incentives that have largely caused
the near extinction of the criminal jury trial . While the Supreme
Court recognized that sentence enhancements affect the Sixth
50. Id. at 5.
51. 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 17, at 20.
52. See United States v. Green, No. 02-10054, 2004 WL 1381101, at *3-*8 (D.Mass. June
18, 2004).
53. See United States v. Speed Joyeras, S.A., 204 F.Supp.2d 412, 428 (E.D.N.Y.. 2002)
("The message to defendants is clear: 'Don't insist on your right to trial."'); Berthoff v.
United States, 140 F.Supp.2d 50, 68 (D.Mass. 2001)("[S]uch [sentencing] disparity imposes
an extraordinary burden on the free exercise of the right to an adjudication of guilt by one's
peers.").
54. See Green, 2004 WL 1381101, at *4; SpeedJoyeras, 204 F.Supp.2d at 428; Berthoff,
140 F.Supp.2d at 68-69 (noting that "[c]riminal trial rates in the United States ... are
plummeting due to the simple fact that today we punish people-punish them severely--
simply for going to trial").
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Amendment right to ajury trial,55 it has paid scant attention to how
sentence reductions impact the structural role of the jury. Indeed,
under Booker, Congress is still free to incorporate mandatory sen-
tence reductions into any new sentencing scheme without
offending the Constitution.
A. The Birth of the Sentencing Guidelines
"Like the proverbial road to hell," as one commentator aptly
noted, "the path to the Guidelines was paved with good inten-
tions."57 The sentencing guidelines were not created to undermine
our constitutional design. To the contrary, they were intended to
provide an important check on the unfettered sentencing discre-
tion of federal judges that resulted in severe sentencing disparity
among similarly situated defendants.5 ' These disparities were often
correlated with constitutionally suspect variables such as race."'
Under the pre-Guideline sentencing regime, federal judges were
given significant discretion in determining the length of incarcera-
tion.6 0 As long as the term was within the broad statutory
boundaries, the sentence was not subject to review on appeal.6'
Consequently, there was no real mechanism for ensuring equity in
punishment.62 Not surprisingly, research revealed troubling dispari-
55. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct 2531, 2538 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
56. At least one jurist has commented on the lack of attention paid to the dying
American jury system. William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, 50 FED. LAw 30,
31-32 (July 2003). In an Open Letter to his colleagues, Judge Young beseeched the federal
judiciary to recognize the crucial loss that the dying jury represents. "Our willingness, as a
society, to drift from the use of juries reflects a failure in the understanding of the jury's
essential function in our American democracy .... It is in fact, the most vital expression of
direct democracy in America today." Id. at 32.
57. Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing, Cato Policy Analysis
No. 458 at 3 (Nov. 1, 2002) at www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-458es.html (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Misguided Guidelines].
58. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines And The Key Compromises On Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. R~v. 1,4-5 (1988) [hereinafter Breyer 1].
59. Id. at 5; see also Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2544 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
60. See generally KATE STITH AND JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 9-29 (The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press 1998) (describing pre-guideline judicial discretion in sentencing).
61. See id. at 9; see also MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 9 (Oxford University
Press 1996) (noting that "proceduralist" sought to reform the pre-guideline sentencing sys-
tem by making decision makers "more accountable" and subject to "review procedures").
62. See Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice Breyer: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 14
CRIM.JUST. 28, 29 (Spring 1999).
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ties in sentencing decisions.6 Not only were defendants who were
committing the same crime subject to vastly different lengths of
incarceration, minorities were seemingly sentenced more harshly
than their white counterparts. Unchecked judicial discretion was
65
viewed as the cause for the differences.
In response to these reports, Congress enacted sweeping sen-
tencing reform that dramatically altered the way in which
defendants convicted in federal court were sentenced.66 The Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 198467 sought to achieve certainty and
fairness in the federal sentencing process by eliminating "unwar-
ranted disparities among sentences for similar defendants
committing similar offenses." 6' Congress determined that by "guid-
ing" judicial discretion, it could decrease if not eliminate
sentencing disparity.
69
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission, an
independent agency housed in the Judicial Branch, and delegated
to it the responsibility of promulgating the guidelines. 70 The trans-
fer of formal sentencing authority from federal judges to the
Sentencing Commission has been described as the "most signifi-
cant development in judging in the federal judicial system since
the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
71
The new regime replaced the long-standing tradition that afforded
judges broad discretion to determine criminal sentences within
statutory limits. 72 Despite the Commission's use of the term
63. Id. (describing "experiments" and research that revealed disparities in sentencing);
but see Stith & Cabranes, supra note 60, at 106-112 (questioning the validity of pre-guideline
disparity research).
64. Breyer I, supra note 58, at 4-6; Melissa M. McGrath, Federal Sentencing Law: Prosecu-
torial Discretion in Determining Departures Based on Defendant's Cooperation Violates Due Process, 15
S. ILL. L.J. 321,324-325 (1990)(discussing pre-guideline disparities).
65. Breyer I, supra note 58, at 5.
66. See The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a),
98 Stat. 1837, 2017-34 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2003)).
67. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. 2, § 212(a) (2), 98 Stat. 1987, 1993-94, 1999-2000
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)).
68. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 60, at 2; see also S.Rep.No. 225, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
52, 56 (1984) .
69. Breyer I, supra note 58, at 5.
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2001).
71. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 60, at 2.
72. See David M. Zlotnick, The War Within The War On Crime: The Congressional Assault on
Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. Rav. 211,216-17 (Winter 2004).
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"guidelines," the sentencing rules it issued were binding on the
federal judiciary."
Criminal defendants challenged the institution of the guideline
system, claiming that the creation of the Sentencing Commission
violated the separation of powers. 4 In Mistretta v. United States,v5 the
Supreme Court rejected this contention and, at least temporarily,
put to rest any doubts about whether the delegation of sentencing
authority to an independent agency housed in the Judicial Branch
76
violated separation of powers.
B. Application of the Sentencing Guidelines
The Court's decision in Mistretta did not silence the sentencing
guidelines' critics, however.7 7 Jurists applying the guidelines de-
nounced that sentencing had been reduced to a mechanistic71
process. One district court described the guidelines as a "wholly
mechanical sentence computation which desensitizes those associ-
ated with it, and converts the sentencing proceeding ... to a
mathematical and logistical exercise., 7 9 The critics also complained
that the promulgation of the guidelines resulted in a radical shift
in the power structure of federal criminal justice.o The abatement
of judicial discretion in sentencing served to expand the authority
of prosecutors at almost every point of the process."' Judges de-
nounced the loss of what they deemed to be judicial discretion in
sentencing as a violation of separation of powers.2 Although rarely
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2000); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427
(1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (referring to the Sentencing Commission as a 'junior varsity"
Congress), abrogated by Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 738.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Gubienso-Ortiz v.
Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1251 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dahlin, 701 F.Supp. 148, 148
n.2 (N.D.Ill. 1988) (finding the guidelines unconstitutional on multiple grounds); United
States v. Richardson, 690 F.Supp. 1030, 1032 (N.D.Ga. 1988).
75. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
76. Id. at 390.
77. See Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L.
REv. 1211, 1236, note 91-97 (2004).
78. SeeJack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 366 (1992).
79. Misguided Guidelines, supra note 57, at 13.
80. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 60, at 145.
81. Id; see also Skye Phillips, Protect Downward Departures: Congress and The Executive's In-
trusion intoJudicial Independence, 12J.L. & POL'Y 947, 974 (2004).
82. SeeJudge Louis F. Oberforder, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge's Perspective-2002,
40 Am. CFiM. L. REv. 11, 16 (Winter 2003); Justice Kennedy also has been an outspoken
critic of the transfer of sentencing discretion away from judges. See Associate Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 4 (Aug. 9, 2003) at
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mentioned, the shift in the power structure also served to under-
mine one of the primary checks on government overreaching: the
jury.
1. Mechanical Justice-As to the first complaint, the mechanical
nature of the guidelines is hard to ignore. The sentencing guide-
lines provide a complex quantitative scheme for determining the
sentence of a criminal defendant.8 3 The mainstay of the sentencing
guidelines is a 258-box grid called the Sentencing Table. 4 The
horizontal axis of this grid, entitled "Criminal History Category,"
adjusts the severity of the sentence based on the offender's past
conviction record.8 5 The vertical axis, entitled "Offense Level," re-
flects a base severity score for the crime committed, adjusted for
those characteristics of the defendant that the Sentencing Com-
mission has deemed relevant to sentencing. 6 In the box at which
the defendant's Criminal History Category and Offense Level in-
tersect is the range within which the judge may sentence the
defendant. 7
Before Booker, a judge could depart from this range in only two
circumstances.88 The first circumstance was that in which the de-
fendant provided substantial assistance to law enforcement
authorities, with the important caveat that the prosecutor must file
a motion requesting the departure.8 9 The judge could not sentence
the defendant to a lesser term on his own accord, nor on the de-
fendant's motion.9 The second situation that allowed a judge to
depart from the guidelines (either up or down) was when the
judge was able to demonstrate on the record that there were fac-
tors or circumstances in the case at hand that were not adequately
addressed by the guidelines.8 ' These were the cases deemed "out-
side the heartland."92 Congress recognized that the Sentencing
Commission could not anticipate every situation when formulating
http//www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-08-09-03.html (on file with the
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
83. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.1 (2003) [hereinafter GUIDELINES
MANUAL]. Section IB1.1 describes the nine step process judges must perform to arrive at an
appropriate guideline sentence. Id.
84. Id. ch. 5. pt. A, see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 60, at 192-93 App. D (provid-
ing a flow chart depicting how federal sentences are calculated).
85. GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2003); see also id. § 1B.1 (f).
86. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, id. § 1BI.1 (a)-(b).
87. Ch. 5, pt. A, app. note 1.
88. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 60, at 75-76.
89. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1; see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
90. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1; id § 5K2.0.
91. Id. § 5K2.0.
92. SeeKoon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996).
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the Guidelines. Thus, judges were given the authority to depart
from the guidelines' range where there existed an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formu-
lating the guidelines."3 In 2003, however, Congress severely
curtailed a federal judge's ability to depart downward on this ba-
sis.
94
2. Unchecked Prosecutorial Power-Closely tied to the mechanistic
nature of the guidelines, was the way in which the sentencing
scheme:-
inevitably shift[s] power toward prosecutors: Because the sen-
tencing rules are known in advance, prosecutors may greatly
influence the ultimate sentence through their decisions on
charges, plea agreements, and motions to depart for substan-
tial assistance to law enforcement authorities. Although
prosecutors have always had significant discretion in charging
and plea bargaining, the prosecutor's decisions on these mat-
ters have far greater significance ... they determine not only
the maximum term of a sentence ... but in many cases, the
precise range of the sentence.95
At each step in the criminal justice process, the prosecutors
(through the sentencing guidelines) could exert an enormous
amount of pressure on the defendant to waive his right to a jury
trial. In the process, the prosecutor could strip the judiciary and
defense counsel of any real role in sentencing and circumvent the
sentencing mandates dictated by Congress.96 More importantly,
93. Id. at 92-96; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b).
94. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act
(PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). The Feeney Amendment,
named after its sponsor freshman Representative Tom Feeney, was attached to the popular
Amber Alert bill. It made several important changes to departures under the sentencing
guidelines. First, it overrules Koon v. United States and required de novo appellate review of all
downward departures. Id. at 670. Second, it prohibited downward departures based on new
grounds on remand. Id. at 671. Third, it required a government motion to allow the addi-
tional one level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. Fourth, it reduced the
number of federal judges on the Sentencing Commission from at least three to no more
than three. Thus, federal judges will never constitute a voting majority. Id. at 676. In addi-
tion, passage of the PROTECT Act marked the first time that Congress bypassed the
Sentencing Commission and actually wrote the guideline language. See Zlotnick, supra note
72, at 232. See generally, Jessica S. Intermill and William E. Martin, Separation of Powers and the
Fenney Amendment: The Constitutional Case for Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 27 HAMLINE L.
REv. 392 (2004). Portions of the PROTECT Act were overruled by the Booker decision.
95. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 60, at 145.
96. See discussion, infra Part III; see also Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the
Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense
[VOL. 38:2
Comprmising Liberty
however, the prosecutor's use of the guidelines could successfully
block the jury as a primary structural check against government
overreaching in the criminal context.
The sentencing guidelines contain both direct and indirect
mechanisms to pressure the defendant to abandon his right to a
jury trial. Direct mechanisms are explicit guideline provisions
meant to discourage the assertion of this right, including the "ac-
ceptance of responsibility" provision, "fast track" disposition,
motions for substantial assistance, and the "relevant conduct" pro-
vision.97  Indirect mechanisms refer to the prosecutor's
manipulation of the guidelines to encourage defendants to waive
fundamental rights, including charge bargaining, factor bargain-
ing, fact bargaining, and binding plea agreements.98 Arguably,
none of these mechanisms by themselves impermissibly interfere
with the structural protections afforded by the jury. In combina-
tion, however, they are a powerful impediment to the check against
tyranny.9 When each of these mechanisms are taken into consid-
eration, a defendant can often reduce her guideline calculation by
six or more levels, in effect cutting her sentence by half or more.100
For a criminal defendant, this is an offer hard to refuse.
It is unclear what effect, if any, the Booker decision will have on
these mechanisms. For judges who adoptJudge Cassell's approach,
the incentives to waive the right to a jury trial will remain largely
intact. Forjudges who choose Judge Adelman's approach, however,
the mechanisms may carry less sway in a criminal defendant's deci-
sion to forego a trial. Moreover, when Congress does address the
sentencing system, it is free to maintain the mandatory nature of
the guidelines that lead to sentence reductions because, according
to the constitutional majority, the Sixth Amendment is only impli-
cated by the mandatory nature of sentence enhancements.
a. Direct Mechanisms--One of the guidelines' most explicit invi-
tations to defendants to waive their right to a jury trial is the
"acceptance of responsibility" provision.'0' Pursuant to section
Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REv. 425, 479 (2004) (discussing
the declining utility of defense counsel).
97. SeeGUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3El.1, 5K3.1, 5K1.1, and 1B1.3
98. See discussion infra Part II.C.
99. As one district court judge observed: "The virtually untrammeled power over sen-
tencing that Congress has ceded to the President's agents is today resulting-through a
combination of grants for substantial assistance, lawful charge bargaining, and illegal fact
bargaining-in a steady erosion of America's criminal jury system with profound and as yet
unknown results." Berthoffv. United States, 140 F.Supp.2d 50, 71 (D.Mass. 2001).
100. United States v. SpeedJoyeros, S.A., 204 F.Supp.2d 412, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
101. GUIDELINE MANUAL § 3E1.1.
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3E.1.1 an offender is eligible for a discount on his sentence if he
"clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense"
by "truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of
conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any ad-
ditional relevant conduct for which the defendant is
accountable.' ' 2 In practice, a defendant "clearly demonstrates" his
contrition when he foregoes a trial by jury.10 3 Indeed, the Applica-
tion Notes state, "This adjustment is not intended to apply to a
defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial
by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and
only then admits guilt and expresses remorse." 10 4 If the defendant
pleads guilty he is eligible for a two to three level reduction in his
offense level-which can translate to a significant reduction in his
ultimate sentence.1
0 5
Like acceptance of responsibility, the guidelines' Early Disposi-
tion Program provides defendants with a sentence discount for up
to a four level reduction in their base offense level if they waive
their rights to an indictment, trial, and appeal. 0 6 A fast track plea
102. Id. app. note 1(a).
103. See United States v. Green, No. 02-10054, 2004 WL 1381101, at * 8 (D.Mass. June
18, 2004) ("What we mean by acceptance of responsibility is simply the discount offered for
pleading guilty (earlier is better), thus saving the Department the trouble, expense, and
uncertainty of ajury trial."). The provision's title is indeed a misnomer. If the reduction was
related to remorse then defendants entering Alford pleas would be ineligible per se. By
entering an Alford plea, a defendant pleads guilty but affirmatively protests her factual in-
nocence to the charged offense. It is the exact opposite of "acceptance of responsibility." Yet
the reduction remains available to those who enter such a plea. See United States v. Harlan,
35 F.3d 176, 181 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Burns, 925 E2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Rodriguez, 905 F.2d 372, 374 (11th Cir. 1990).
104. GUIDELINE MANUAL, § 3El.l, app. note 2.
105. Id. § 3El.1. As a side note, the reduction has not just effected the assertion of the
right to ajury trial. It has also impacted the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable search and seizure. See United States v. Gonzalez, 70 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir.
1995). For example, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a defendant who raised a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the admissibility of evidence pre-trial was not eligible for the ac-
ceptance of responsibility discount. Id. The Court concluded that, "by challenging the
admissibility of the essential evidence against him, Gonzalez attempted to avoid the deter-
mination of factual guilt and thereby escape responsibility for his crime." Id.
106. See GUIDELINE MANUAL, § 5K3.1 (allowing for a four level departure); Brief for
Government at App. D, United States v. Ruiz 536 U.S. 622 (2002). Included in the govern-
ment's brief was a copy of Ruiz's fast-track Brady waiver agreement:
The Government represents that any information establishing the factual innocence
of the defendant known to the undersigned prosecutor in this case has been turned
over to the defendant. The Government understands it has a continuing duty to pro-
vide such information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant. The
defendant understands that if this case proceeded to trial, the Government would be
required to provide impeachment information relating to any informants or other
witnesses. In addition, if the defendant raised an affirmative defense, the Govern-
ment would be required to provide information in its possession that supports such a
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agreement may also require a defendant to waive her right to re-
ceive impeachment information relating to any informants or
other witnesses, as well as the right to receive information support-
ing any affirmative defense the defendant may raise if the case goes
to trial. 10 7 A fast-track disposition allows the government to acceler-
ate the conviction process,0 8 and the programs are employed
mainly in judicial districts with an unusually high volume of drug
and immigration offenses.'09 Unlike the acceptance of responsibil-
ity factor, the early disposition program is completely in the hands
of the prosecutor."0 The program is available in a select number of
districts, and the prosecutors, not the guidelines, dictate what is
necessary to obtain a recommended departure."'
Substantial assistance motions provide criminal defendants with
another incentive to plead guilty to obtain reduced sentences. Sec-
tion 5K1.1 of the sentencing guidelines states: "Upon a motion by
the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the
guidelines."" 2 While federal judges have the ultimate say as to
defense. In return for the Government's promises set forth in this agreement, the de-
fendant waives the right to this information, and agrees not to attempt to withdraw
the guilty plea or to file a collateral attack based on the existence of this information.
Id.
107. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 624 (2002). According to the Supreme
Court, "[t]he Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeach-
ment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant." Id. at 623.
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's contention that a defendant could not voluntarily
and knowingly waive her right to a jury trial without receiving exculpatory impeachment
information. Id. at 629.
108. See United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the fast-track programs allows the government to secure a large number of convictions
with relatively little use of resources); see also United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 E3d 757, 759
(9th Cir. 1995) (describing the fast-track program in the Southern District of California).
109. See United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Downward Depar-
tures From the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Pub. L. No. 108-21, October 2003, at 63-64,
available at http://www.uss.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Report to Congress]. The Department of
Justice indicated that the programs exist in some form in one half of the 94judicial districts.
Id.
110. Id. at 14 (describing the Attorney General's program).
111. Id. at 15. But see Michael M. O'Hear, Localization and Transparency in Sentenc-
ing: Reflections on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REv. 358, 359
(2004) (lauding the early disposition program because it allows federal sentencing guide-
lines to be adapted to local needs and values).
112. GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1
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whether and to what degree a departure should be granted,11 3 judi-
cial discretion is not triggered until the government makes a
motion." 4 By implication, the departure is only available to those
who plead guilty. The 5Kl.1 motion is an extremely powerful in-
centive for a defendant to waive his constitutional guarantees
because it allows a court to sentence below the guideline range."5
Utterly within the Department's control, substantial assistance mo-
tions are the major ground for downward departures from the
guidelines." 6 It does not appear that Booker will alter the strength
of this provision for prosecutors. While it seems that a judge may
consider a defendant's cooperation as a factor in sentencing even
in the absence of a government motion, it is unlikely that a judge
will be able to go below a statutory mandatory minimum without a
motion from the government.
Finally, the focus of the guidelines on "real offense" sentencing
has had a significant impact on a criminal defendant's decision
whether to seek a trial by jury. Under the guidelines, a defendant's
sentence is not based solely on the criminal conduct for which she
was arrested, but also on any other "relevant conduct" presented by
113. Given the almost unanimous disregard for the sentencing guidelines among the
federal judiciary, federal judges rarely miss an opportunity to depart downward. See Tonry,
supra note 61, at 75 (describing judicial reaction to the guidelines).
114. See United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1991). A defendant can chal-
lenge the government's decision not to make a motion under § 5K1.1. See Wade v. United
States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86. However, a defendant is entitled to relief only if the prosecu-
tor's motive is animated by an unconstitutional or other impermissible motive, or where
there is government misconduct or bad faith. See id Thus, any "discretion" available to
judges is, in many respects, illusory.
115. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 131 (1996). Substantial assistance mo-
tions have been called "a significant source of hidden sentencing." Honorable Patti B. Saris,
Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disaparity? One
Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK L. REv. 1027, 1045 (1997). "Because of the fair concern
about a cooperating defendant's safety, many plea agreements are impounded, and sentenc-
ing hearings based on cooperation are often closed to the press and the public." Id. at 1047.
There is virtually no appellate review of most downward departure decisions pursuant to a
5Kl.1 motion. See, e.g., United States v. Nesbitt, 90 F3d 164, 166 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that
defendant may not appeal the extent of the district court's departure); United States v.
Parker, 902 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The circumstances in which a defendant may ap-
peal a sentence ... do not include situations in which a defendant is seeking an enhanced
downward departure."). As one judge noted:
[d]ownward departures based on substantial assistance motions are an invitation to
unwarranted, secret sentencing disparity. There is no judicial review of the govern-
ment's decision whether to file a substantial assistance motion, and as a practical
matter, a sentencing court has unfettered discretion in determining the extent of
downward departures.
Saris, supra note 115, at 1049.
116. See Report to Congress, supra note 109, at 60, 67.
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the prosecutor."17 Relevant conduct includes any acts related to the
crime of conviction, including all reasonably foreseeable behavior,
and even those acts that were not part of the underlying crime but
were connected to "the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan." i. There are few limits placed on what informa-
tion a prosecutor can present concerning the background,
character, or conduct of a defendant for a sentencing court to con-
sider in imposing a sentence.1 9 Judicial findings concerning
relevant conduct can have a significant effect on a defendant's sen-
tence. Such conduct need only be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence, may be based on hearsay, and can include acts for
which the defendant was acquitted.
20
The case of Vernon Watts is a chilling example of the pitfalls of
the relevant conduct provision. 2' Watts was arrested after police
detectives discovered cocaine in his kitchen cabinet and guns and
ammunition hidden in his bedroom closet.
12 2
A jury convicted Watts of possessing cocaine base with intent
to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1), but acquit-
ted him of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Despite Watts' acquittal on the
firearms count, the District Court found by a preponderance
of the evidence that Watts had possessed the guns in connec-
tion with the drug offense. In calculating Watts' sentence, the
court therefore added two points to his base offense level un-
der United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual
§ 2D1.1 (b) (1) (Nov. 1995) (USSG).' 25
117. GUIDELINE MANUAL § 1B1.3(a); 18 U.S.C. 3661 (2003). See generally Federal Crimi-
nal Procedure Committee of the American Trial Lawyers, The American College of Trial Lauyers
Proposed Modifications to the Relevant Conduct Provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
38 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1463 (2001)[hereinafter Proposed Modifications];Julie R. O'Sullivan, In
Defense of the US. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1342
(Summer 1997).
118. GUIDELINE MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
119. See GUIDELINE MANUAL §§ 1B1.3 and 1B1.4. Section 1B1.4 states that a court "may
consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and
conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law." See also United States v. Baird,
109 F.3d 856, 863 (3rd Cir. 1997).
120. See Proposed Modifications, supra note 117, at 1464-65.
121. Watts v. United States, 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
122. Id. at 149.
123. Id. at 149-50.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the enhancement, concluding that
acquitted conduct can still be relevant conduct for purposes of sen-
tencing.
1 24
The lesson from this case is a sobering one: you can win at trial
only if there is a complete acquittal; if you're convicted of any-
thing, you can be punished for everything. 25  The "relevant
conduct" provision of the guidelines allows prosecutors to greatly
enhance the length of a sentence without being hampered by the
high standard of proof present at trial. 126 If a defendant pleads
guilty, he may be able to negotiate a more benign accounting of his
relevant conduct, or, at the very least, counter his relevant conduct
with the benefits granted those who waive their constitutional
rights.
2 7
After Blakely, it was unclear whether the relevant conduct provi-
sions would survive a Sixth Amendment challenge. The Supreme
Court made no mention of it in Apprendi or Blakely. Watts relied
primarily upon 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that "[n]o limita-
tion shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and con-
sider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. 028
Watts did not address the Sixth Amendment, and in fact relied
heavily upon a Fifth Amendment double jeopardy case, Witte v.
United States, which held that the use of relevant conduct to en-
hance a sentence does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause129
Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Blakely, wrote a
concurring opinion in Watts. 30 In his concurrence, he observed
that if the courts or Sentencing Commission were dissatisfied with
124. Watts, 519 U.S. at 156. Watts does not represent an isolated incident. A similar sce-
nario occurred in the First Circuit. See United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1995).
In Maine, two defendants were acquitted of murder under state law. Id. at 172. They were
then indicted in federal court of various counts, including conspiracy to possess a firearm in
violation of the felon in possession statute. Id. at 173 note 1. After one defendant plead, the
other was convicted by a jury. Under the sentencing guidelines, without reference to the
murder, the guideline range for one of the defendants would have been roughly between
262 and 327 months under the armed career criminal statute. Id. at 175 note 6. However,
because the federal sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the murder, the defendant received a life sentence-more than he
would have under state law. Id. at 174.
125. See Gerald Shargel, Run-on Sentencing Slate at http//slate.msn.com/id/2103754
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
126. See Proposed Modifications, supra note 117, at 1464-65.
127. See infra Part II.C.
128. Watts, 519 U.S. at 151.
129. Id. at 152-55.
130. Id. at 158.
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the "rules of evidence and proof established by the Constitution
and law," they may make recommended changes to Congress.
1 3 1
However, the Booker constitutional majority indicated that the
sentence enhancement in Watts did violate the Sixth Amendment.
Unfortunately, the remedial majority's opinion essentially can-
celled the potency of this conclusion. The remedial majority
specifically instructed judges to maintain "a strong connection be-
tween the sentence imposed and the offender's real
conduct .... Under the Booker sentencing regime, a judge will
be free to enhance a defendant's sentence based on facts not
found by a jury nor admitted by the defendant. Thus, there re-
mains the threat that a defendant could be acquitted of conduct
and then sentenced based on that conduct.
b. Indirect Mechaniss-Charge bargaining, factor bargaining,
fact bargaining, and binding plea agreements are tools used by
prosecutors to encourage defendants to waive their right to a jury
trial. Each represents an enormous incentive to plead guilty be-
cause not only can they reduce the guideline sentence range, they
can also circumvent the mandatory minimum created by Congress.
It is unlikely that Booker will have a significant effect on these ma-
nipulations, and in fact may actually enhance their effectiveness.
Prosecutors, intent on maintaining the power the mandatory
guidelines provided them, are likely to turn to these remaining
bargaining chips.
The most traditional of the Department's bargaining chips is so-
called "charge bargaining": the ability to drop charges at will. This
has always been the prosecutor's prerogative.1 33 A prosecutor has
broad discretion to decide what charges to bring and whom to
charge.! " The prosecutor exerts pressure on the defendant by
bringing a multi-count indictment and then trading away charges
or counts more difficult to prove, in return for a guilty plea to
other counts or lesser charges.115 Charge bargaining is often used
to obtain sentencing outcomes below the otherwise applicable sen-
tencing guideline range."'
131. Id.
132. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757.
133. SeeWayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
134. Id.
135. SeeUnited States v. Green, No. 02-10054, 2004 WL 1381101, at *6 (D.Mass.June 18,
2004).
136. See Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that
Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 21, 62 (2000).
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The recent case of Lea Fastow, wife of former Enron finance
chief Andrew Fastow, shows the significant effect of charge bargain-
ing on a criminal defendant's final sentence. Ms. Fastow was
originally charged with six felony counts related to her role in the
Enron debacle, which carried the potential for several years in
prison."7 However, she reached a plea agreement under which she
would serve only five months in prison.138 The sentencing judge
rejected the plea because he considered the sentence too leni-
ent.39 The Department of Justice then simply dismissed the
original indictment and replaced it with a single misdemeanor tax
charge to which Ms. Fastow plead guilty, resulting in a maximum
sentence of twelve months.14° The sentencing judge rebuked the
Department of Justice for its actions, noting that it was "a blatant
manipulation of the federal justice system." 41
The promulgation of the sentencing guidelines also spawned a
new type of bargaining: "factor bargaining." In guideline factor
bargaining, the government stipulates in the plea agreement that it
will either not oppose an adjustment based on a particular guide-
line factor, or it will actively support such an adjustment.' This
occurs most frequently in the context of the role-in-the-offense ad-
justment.4 3  Typically, the presentence report and the offense
description suggest that the defendant should be subject to an ag-
gravating role adjustment as an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of the criminal activity.'" In such cases, the plea bargain
will contain an agreement that the prosecutor will not recommend
an aggravating role adjustment.145 In other cases in which the pre-
sentence report and the offense description provide no evidence
that the defendant played a mitigating role, the plea bargain none-
theless contains an agreement to recommend a two to four level
137. Mary Flood & Clifford Pugh, Lea Fastow Expresses 'Regret' at Sentencing, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, May 7, 2004, at 19, available at 2004 WL 57827485.
138. John R. Emshwiller, Executives On Trial, WALL ST.J., May 7, 2004, at C3, available at
2004 WL-WSJ 56928436.
139. Id.
140. Carrie Johnson, Lea Fastow Sentenced to 1-Year Term, WASH. POST, May 7, 2004, E01
available at 2004 WL 74485894.
141. Id.
142. Stephen Schulhofer & Illene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations, Under The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention And Its Dynamics In the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1284, 1293 (1997) [hereinafter Guideline Circumvention].
143. Illene H. Nagel & Stephen Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501,





reduction on the grounds that the defendant was a minor partici-
pant in the criminal activity.
14 6
Because factor bargaining generally reduces a defendant's ulti-
mate sentence, Blakely did not interfere with its use. In fact, Blakely
was more likely lead to an increase in factor bargaining.1 4 7 Prosecu-
tors intent on maneuvering around Blakely negotiated any
sentencing factor that raised a defendant's sentence above the
statutory maximum.4 8 Current trends suggest that prosecutors will
include a myriad of factors in the original indictment, negotiate a
plea agreement, withdraw the original indictment, and then simply
re-indict consistent with the plea agreement.
4 9
It is uncertain whether Booker will result in a decrease in factor
bargaining. While the remedial majority instructed judges to "con-
sider guideline ranges" when imposing a sentence, it is unclear
whether judges will continue to abide by the upward and down-
ward adjustments warranted by the myriad of sentencing factors
contained in the Guidelines. It appears that judges will still calcu-
late a sentence using the Guidelines and then, depending on their
interpretation of Booker, raise or lower that sentence using their
discretion. Thus, the government and defense counsels' presenta-
tion of the relevant sentencing factors will still play a significant
role in determining a defendant's ultimate sentence.
The guidelines have also sparked "fact bargaining." Fact bargain-
ing is the process whereby the prosecutor fails to report to the
probation officer and the court relevant evidence that may affect
the guidelines calculation. 5° By failing to report certain facts, the
prosecutor can reduce the guideline range to secure a sentence to
which she and defense counsel have agreed.'' One study suggests
that fact bargaining occurs in up to one third of plea bargains,'
52
occurring most often with respect to drug quantity or type, or to
146. Id. at 547-48.
147. See Memorandum From James Comey, Dep. Atty. Gen. To All Federal Prosecutors,
Departmental Legal Positions and Policies in Light of Blakely v. Washington (July 2, 2004) avail-
able at http//sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-policy/files/dag_blakely_memo_
7204.pdf (on file with the University of MiciganJournal of Law Reform).
148. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 315,
320 (2004) available at http://ssm.wm/abstract=570161 (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
149. Id.
150. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 60, at 132.
151. United States v. Berthoff, 140 F.Supp.2d 50, 63 (D. Mass. 2001).
152. See Guideline Circumvention, supra note 142, at 1292; see also United States v. Lawson,
751 F.Supp. 1350, 1354 note 2 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (indentifying a study in which judges re-
ported observing fact bargaining in 73% of guideline cases).
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dollar amount in economic crimes.11 The prosecutor and defen-
dant stipulate to a factual scenario different from reality to control
not only the sentencing range but the applicable mandatory
minimum. Fact bargaining is explicitly prohibited by the sentenc-
ing guidelines,1 54 and it is a fraud on the court.55
Like factor bargaining, fact bargaining will likely continue un-
abated after Booker. According to the remedial majority, judges are
still to engage in real offense sentencing. 5 6 Thus, the relevant facts
as presented by the prosecutor and defense counsel and described
in the presentence report will still play a significant role in sentenc-
ing.
The binding plea agreement has taken on new importance un-
der the sentencing guidelines. Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(c) (1) (c), the Department of Justice may
"agree [with the defendant] that a specific sentence or sentencing
range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or
sentencing factor does or does not apply.' 17 Once the court ac-
cepts the plea agreement, the Department's recommendation is
binding.
5 8
Binding plea agreements are yet another incentive to plead
guilty. The Department of Justice can use them to grant extraordi-
nary benefits not accorded to other defendants tendering pleas, or
perhaps to evade the established guideline sentencing range or the
congressionally mandated minimum sentence. 59  Binding plea
agreements have become a powerful tool in circumventing the sen-
tencing guidelines. The Sentencing Commission recently reported
to Congress that an "overwhelming majority (91.2%) of plea
153. See A Tale of Three Cities, supra note 143, at 547.
154. GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.4(a)(2).
155. See Berthoff 140 F.Supp.2d at 62-63; Tony Garoppolo, Fact Bargaining: What the Sen-
tencing Commission Hath Wrought, 10 CRIM. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 405, 405 (Oct. 9, 1996)
("[The] widespread use of fact bargaining, and the lying to the court that is inevitable with
the frequent use of such bargaining, is the dirty little secret in the prosecution of federal
criminal cases.").
156. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757 ("The other approach, which we now adopt, would
(through severance and excision of the two provisions) make the Guidelines system advisory
while maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's
real conduct-a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Con-
gress intended its Guidelines system to achieve.").
157. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(c)(2003).
158. Id.
159. See United States v. Aqua-Leisure Indus., Inc., 150 F.3d 95, 96 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting
that the binding plea agreements provided for sentences well below what could have been
imposed under the statutes and sentencing guidelines); see also Report to Congress, supra
note 109, at 46.
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agreements in the sample" were binding plea agreements' 60 and
that these account for nearly twenty percent of all downward de-
partures from the appropriate guideline range. 61 Judges, except in
rare circumstances, are likely to accept them, especially if the ulti-
mate sentence accords with a particular judge's sense of justice.6
Under Booker, binding plea agreements may take on even more
significance. While prosecutors may no longer be able to dictate
the sentencing range, they can still negotiate a sentence through
the binding plea agreement.
C. Plea Bargaining
An overview of plea bargaining helps further the understanding
of the sentencing guidelines' effect on the jury.63 Plea bargaining is
essentially an arrangement between a prosecutor and an accused
offender where each party exchanges something of value with the
other." A criminal defendant provides something of value to the
prosecutor (i.e., a guilty plea or inculpatory information on an-
other's criminal activity) in exchange for receiving less punishment
than if she went to trial and was convicted. 6
Since the inception of the sentencing guidelines, the federal
criminal justice system has become predominantly a plea bargain-
ing institution. 166 One federal judge has observed that the key to
160. Report to Congress, supra note 109, at 46.
161. Id.
162. See United States v. Green, No. 02-10054, 2004 WL 1381101, at *8 (D.Mass.June 18,
2004).
163. Plea bargaining is a complex and oft-debated practice and it is beyond the scope of
this Article to enter that debate. But for a helpful historical perspective of plea bargaining,
see generally Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12-16
(1979); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
247, 247-48 (1979); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13
LAw & Soc'Y REv. 261, 261-69 (1979).
164. See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really "Ban"Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns
of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 755 (1998); Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecu-
tor's Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93 note 1 (2003).
165. Christopher, supra note 164, at 755; Guidorizzi, supra note 164, at 755.
166. 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 17, at 20. Figure C reveals a stead increase in guilty
pleas between 1998 and 2002. In 2002, 97.1 percent of criminal defendants plead guilty
compared to 93.6 percent in 1998. The rise in plea bargains is even more striking when the
numbers are compared to pre-Guideline percentages. The Administrative Office reports
that in 1986, 81 percent of criminal defendants plead guilty. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF BY METHOD OF DISPOSITION
1971-2003, Table 3.5 available at http//www.uscourts.gov/udicialfactsfigures/table3.05 (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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understanding current federal sentencing policy under the guide-
lines is to recognize that,
[t]he Department [of Justice] is so addicted to plea bargain-
ing to leverage its law enforcement resources to an
overwhelming conviction rate that the focus of our entire
criminal justice system has shifted far away from trials and ju-
ries and adjudication to a massive system of sentence
bargaining that is heavily rigged against the accused citizen.
67
Despite, or perhaps because of, the extensive use of plea bargain-
ing, scholars and policymakers debate its propriety. Scholars have
argued for years that the system is inherently flawed and unfair for
defendants. Its effect on the jury system has not gone unno-
ticed. 169 Plea bargains have been described as "invading barbarians"
that "bloodlessly and clandestinely swept across the penal land-
scape and dr[ove] our vanquished jury into small pockets of
resistance."1 70
For better or worse, the Supreme Court has accepted plea bar-
gains as a legitimate, essential, and desirable part of the criminal
justice system. 17' Throughout its plea bargain jurisprudence, the
Court has consistently rejected the argument that the Sixth
Amendment forbids every government-imposed choice in the
criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of
trial. Under the Court's framework, it is ap-the right to a jury a. Un  .Cutsf mwr, ti
propriate for a defendant who chooses to forego his right to a jury
trial to receive a lighter sentence than a defendant who is con-
victed by ajury. 17 While the Court recognizes that "the imposition
of these difficult choices" has a "discouraging effect on the defen-
167. United States v. Green, No. 02-10054, 2004 WL 1381101, at *2 (D.Mass. June 18,
2004). The Court's statement poses an interesting question regarding who is guarding the
public's interest in criminal trials. Given the Department ofJustice's enormous reliance on
plea bargaining, it is unlikely that it is acting as a guardian of the public interest in criminal
jury trials as the Supreme Court has assumed. See, e.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368, 384 (1979).
168. See Guidorizzi, supra note 164, at 768.
169. See Gertner, supra note 23, at 431; see also Berthoff v. United States, 140 F.Supp.2d
50, 67, note 31 (D.Mass. 2001).
170. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (March 2000).
171. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 (1973); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
172. See Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971)("The criminal process, like the
rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring 'the making of difficult judg-
ments' as to which course to follow .... Although a defendant may have a right, even of
constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not
always forbid requiring him to choose.")
173. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1977).
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dant's assertion of his trial rights," it accepts them as an "inevitable
attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages
the negotiation of pleas."
174
Courts and commentators have questioned whether the sentenc-
ing guidelines have corrupted the plea bargaining system to such
an extent that it is unconstitutional.1 15 Admittedly, the sentencing
guidelines have exacerbated the acknowledged flaws in the pre-
existing plea bargaining system.176 Under the previous indetermi-
nate sentencing scheme, prosecutors and defendants could barter
for a lighter sentence, but ultimately the sentencing authority
rested with the judge.177 Thus, while prosecutors could dangle the
carrot of a lighter sentence or wield the stick of a significant length
of incarceration, they could only recommend, they could not pro-
nounce. 178 Under the pre-Booker sentencing system, the prosecutor
could predict with some certainty a defendant's potential sentence,
and more troubling, could influence that sentence greatly."7 While
adding certainty to the mix, the pre-Booker sentencing scheme
placed an enormous amount of power in the prosecutor's hands. 8°
As the statistics show, prosecutors wielded that power with incredi-
ble success. The prosecutor's power was enhanced by the court's
crowded criminal dockets. Judges, anxious to clear their dockets,
had little incentive to question a bargain to which both parties ap-
parently agreed.
181
The Supreme Court accepted the sentencing guideline's effect
on plea bargains with relative ease."' It was unmoved by the "gross
disparity" in the relative bargaining power of the parties to the plea
agreements, stating that plea offers are "indistinguishable from any
number of difficult choices that criminal defendants face
174. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 31
175. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the CriminalJury: The CriminalJury's Constitutional Role
in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 96-97 (2003); see also United States v.
Joyeras, S.A., 204 F.Supp.2d 412, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
176. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Illene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRM. L. Rv. 231, 232 (1989).
177. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence
Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38
WAKE FOREST L. Rv. 1111, 1116-1119 (2003) (discussing the judge's role in an indetermi-
nate sentencing scheme).
178. See id.
179. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
180. See id.
181. See United States v. Fiterman, 732 F.Supp. 878, 882 (NOTED. Ill. 1989) ("Con-
gested trial calendars provide a natural disincentive for judges to scrutinize plea bargains
and possibly upset guilty pleas.")
182. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209 (1995).
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everyday.' ' 83 It dismissed the potential for abuse of prosecutorial
bargaining power under the sentencing guidelines as an insuffi-
cient basis for foreclosing negotiation altogether. 84 Instead, it
suggested that the appropriate response is to permit case-by-case
inquiries into whether waivers were the product of fraud or coer-
cion."'
But the Supreme Court's waiver jurisprudence overlooked the
sentencing disparity that occurred under the pre-Booker sentencing
guidelines. In United States v. Rodriguez,186 for example, the defen-
dants' decisions to waive or not to waive their rights to a jury trial
resulted in a 700 percent difference in sentence length. In Rodri-
guez, the government indicted six defendants, charging all of them
with engaging in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine.8 7 The
district court found that this conspiracy was responsible for the dis-
tribution of approximately 5,000 grams of crack cocaine.' At
sentencing, the district court held the two defendants who elected
to go to trial accountable for all 5,000 grams of cocaine. In con-
trast, the three defendants who plead guilty were only held
responsible for the amount of drugs each had personally handled
(between 5 and 20 grams). The disparity in drug quantity led to a
striking disparity in sentencing. The sentences for the three defen-
dants who plead guilty ranged from time served to 60 months of
imprisonment.9 The sentences for the two defendants who as-
serted their right to a jury trial ranged from 235 months to 262
months of imprisonment190 Based on the Supreme Court's waiver
jurisprudence, the appellate court concluded that the sentencing
disparity was not an unconstitutional burden on an individual's
right to ajury trial.'9 '
As Rodriguez reveals, the mandatory sentencing guidelines cre-
ated compelling incentives to plead guilty. In operation, the
guidelines allowed for enormous sentencing disparities based en-
tirely on an individual's decision to maintain his innocence until
the government could prove his guilt to ajury beyond a reasonable
doubt.9 2 It is unlikely that Booker will alter this dynamic. Arguably,
183. Id. at 209-10.
184. Id at 210.
185. Id.
186. 162 F.3d 135 (lst Cir. 1998).
187. Id. at 140.
188. Id. at 150.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 152.
192. See Berthoff 140 F.Supp.2d 50, 70 (D.Mass. 2001) (identifying a 700 percent differ-
ence in the sentences of a defendant who plead guilty and a co-defendant who went to trial).
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the federal judiciary is as addicted to plea bargaining as the De-
partment of Justice. Federal judges have come to rely on the
speedy disposition of their criminal dockets through negotiated
plea bargains. Additionally, the Justices recognized that even under
a discretionary system, "[p]rosecutors and defense attorneys would
still resolve the lion's share of criminal matters through plea bar-
gaining, and plea bargaining takes place without a jury. ", 9 3
Moreover, many federal judges have never sentenced without the
guidelines as a marker. It is unlikely that these judges will alter
their sentencing habits so dramatically that the disparities will dis-
appear or even be significantly reduced.
The effect of the sentencing guidelines on the jury is obvious.
Given the option between time served and over 20 years in prison,
a defendant's choice is easy. Congress created a sentencing system
that providesProsecutors tremendous leverage in the plea bargain-
ing process,'9 forced criminal defense attorneys to adopt the role
of transactional attorneys rather than zealous advocates, 95 and vir-
tually eliminated the criminal jury as a viable check on government
overreaching. 96
Unfortunately, Booker did nothing to enhance the role of the
jury. At most, it transferred unchecked power from the hands of
the prosecutor to the hands of individual judges. Ironically, when a
judge is bound by the Guidelines, the Constitution requires that
the jury play a prominent role in the sentencing. However, "when a
trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence
within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury deter-
mination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.' 97
193. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 758.
194. See infra note 127 and accompanying text; see generally William T. Powell and Mi-
chael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox
Guarding the Hen House? 97 W. VA. L. Rav. 373, 394-95 (1995) (discussing how the sentencing
guidelines have provided the prosecutor with almost complete control over the sentencing).
195. Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal
Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. Rv. 425, 479 (2004) ("Unfortunately, in criminal courts today the
hands of defense counsel are often tied. The Guidelines have fostered a regime under which
a zealous lawyer can be as harmful to a defendant's case as an underzealous one.").
196. See 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 17, at 20.
197. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750.
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III. THE JURY'S ROLE IN OUR TRIPARTITE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the sentencing
guidelines have created a structural imbalance in our system of
government. The original guidelines placed a significant amount
of unchecked power in the hands of the prosecutor,"' and the post-
Booker guidelines simply transfer some of that power to federal
judges. While the intent of the guidelines was not to undermine
the role of the jury, this has been the outcome. Congress, without
comment by the Supreme Court, enacted a sentencing regime that
essentially eviscerated the jury's structural role in our tripartite sys-
tem of government.
Unfortunately, jurists and scholars alike tend to view the jury
solely through a Sixth Amendment lens, acknowledging its Article
III origins only in passing.20 The universal failure to recognize the
jury's structural role originated in the Supreme Court's decision in
Patton v. United States. 201 In Patton, the Supreme Court made the
thinly supported assertion that the jury provision in Article III and
the right to a jury in the Sixth Amendment were identical-both
relating to the accused's right to ajury trial.02 Since then, the idea
that the jury is solely an individual right that can be circumvented
by a defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver has become in-
grained in our collective constitutional conscience. Jurists accept
its validity as readily as sailors once accepted the pronouncement
that the earth was flat.
Our reluctance to let go of this vision of the jury is, in part, fu-
eled by the erroneous belief that if we accept the structural role of
the jury, then the individual right to a jury trial will become an im-
perative rather than a privilege. 3 Such a belief conjures up the
specter of criminal defendants unable to avoid a trial even when
they willingly admit their guilt. But the Sixth Amendment right to
198. See discussion supra Part II.B.
199. See discussion supra Part II.
200. While most opinions or articles note the reference to the jury contained in Article
III, rarely is it discussed as distinct from the right to a jury trial described in the Sixth
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanato, 513 U.S. 196, 209-10 (1995); Corbitt v.
NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1930);
see generally, Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 801, 850-51
(2003) (discussing the jury trial as a structural check in the context of the Sixth Amend-
ment); Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its
Consequences, 37 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 1363 (Fall 2000) (discussing § 3El.1 on the Sixth
Amendment right to ajury trial).
201. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).




a jury trial can coexist with the structural role of the jury in the
same way that the right to an independent and impartial adjudica-
tor can coexist with the structural role of the independent
judiciary.2 0 4 A criminal defendant's ability to waive his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial is not affected by the recognition
that the jury is part of our tripartite system of government, any-
more than a civil litigant's ability to waive his right to an
independent and impartial adjudicator is affected by the recogni-
tion that an independent judiciary is part of the constitutional
design.2 0 5 In the sentencing context, what is affected is Congress'
ability to pass legislation that interferes with the jury's constitu-
tionally assigned role to check government overreaching.
Before the structural balance can be restored, however, we must
dramatically shift the way we think about the role of the jury in our
system of government. It is important to distinguish the criminal
jury trial referenced in Article III from an individual's right to a
jury trial identified in the Sixth Amendment. 26 The former embod-
ies the right of the people to participate in the administration of
the laws and act as a check against tyranny through the institution
of the jury. The latter represents an individual's right to access that
institution. Because they serve two distinct purposes, the two jury
provisions can and should be interpreted differently.
A. The Starting Point: Discrediting Patton v. United States
Reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in Patton v. United
StateS67 is the starting point for restoring the constitutional equilib-
rium. In Patton, the Court first addressed the jury provisions in
Article III and the Sixth Amendment, discussing how they related
to the ability of a criminal defendant to waive his right to a jury.2°8
The Court framed the inquiry by asking: "Is the effect of the consti-
tutional provisions in respect of trial by jury to establish a Tribunal
as a part of the frame of government, or only to guarantee to the
accused the right to such a trial? ",2 09 After a cursory review of
204. See discussion infra Part III.C and D.
205. See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
206. See discussion infra Part III.C.
207. 281 U.S. 276 (1930) abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
208. Id. at 294-95.
209. Id. at 293.
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English and colonial jurisprudence, the Court determined "it is
reasonable to conclude that the framers of the Constitution simply
were intent upon preserving the right of trial by jury primarily for
the protection of the accused."'21 Consequently, the Court con-
cluded that the right to trial by jury embodied in the Sixth
Amendment and the criminal jury referenced in Article III were
one and the same.2 1'
The Court, however, made a critical error when it failed to dis-
tinguish these two jury provisions. This error is evident in the
Court's comment that,
[t]he first ten amendments and original Constitution were
substantially contemporaneous and should be construed in
pari materia. So construed, the latter provision fairly may be
regarded as reflecting the meaning of the former. In other
words, the two provisions mean substantially the same thing
.... Upon this view the constitutional provisions we conclude
that article 3, s. 2 is not jurisdictional, but was meant to confer
a right upon the accused which he may forego at his election.
To deny his power to do so is to convert a privilege into an
imperative.1
By essentially collapsing the two provisions, the Court dealt a seri-
ous blow to the jury's role in our tripartite system of government.
The Court's error can be traced to its inadequate analysis cou-
pled with its cursory examination of the historical evidence. In
rejecting the contention that the jury was part of the government
structure, the Court relied on evidence that the early Americans
deemed the right to a jury trial a fundamental right of the ac-
cused.2' 3 Based on this, the Court concluded that "the framers of
the Constitution simply were intent upon preserving the right of
trial by jury primarily for the protection of the accused." 21 4 To bol-
ster this conclusion, the Court pointed to the absence of support
for the structural argument in historical documents, reasoning that
if the Framers had intended the jury to have a place in the struc-
ture of the government, "it is strange nothing appears in
contemporaneous literature or in any debates or innumerable dis-
cussions of the time.' 5
210. Id. at 297.
211. Id. at 298.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 296.
214. Id. at 297.
215. Id.
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The Court's conclusion, however, that the right to ajury trial was
deemed a fundamental right of the accused does not inexorably
lead to the conclusion that the Framers did not intend it to play a
part in the structure of the government. The Court's reasoning
rested upon the unsupported belief that if it deemed the Article III
jury provision a structural check, then the right to ajury housed in
the Sixth Amendment would no longer be a privilege but an im-
perative.2 6 But the jury can serve both as a structural protection
within the constitutional scheme and a safeguard to litigants'
rights.2 1 7 In fact, in another Article III context, the Court has ac-
knowledged that an Article III structural protection can also be an
independent right waivable by a litigant. Specifically, the Court has
recognized that the independent judiciary housed in Article III § 1
serves a dual role-it "not only preserves to litigants their interest
in an impartial and independent federal adjudication of claims ...
but also serves as 'an inseparable element of the constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances.' ,211 If the independence of federal
judges can serve both functions, it follows that the jury can serve
both functions as well.
The Court's reliance on the absence of historical evidence to
support the structural argument is misplaced, if not disingenuous.
There is significant historical evidence to support the idea that the
jury is a structural protection included within the Judicial Branch.
Many scholars, foremost among them Professor Akhil Amar, con-
tend that the Framers gave the criminal jury a prominent role in
protecting liberty.2 9 According to these scholars, the Framers per-
ceived an inseparable connection between liberty and the jury as
an "institution."20 As a result, the Framers included the jury in the
216. Id. at 298.
217. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,848 (1986).
218. Id. at 850.
219. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 84
(Yale University Press 1998); RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 25 (Yale
University Press 2003); Edward J. Erler, The Constitution and Separation of Powers, in THE
FRAMING AND RATIFYING OF THE CONSTITUTION 153 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds, 1987).
Erler contends that the original view of the judiciary in Montesquieu's separation of powers
theory was that the "power ofjudging was to be exercised by juries drawn periodically from
the people, and in the exercise of the jury function the people themselves were to be
judges." Id. Barkow, supra note 175, at 48 (discussing jury nullification); George C. Harris,
The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and the Rights of the Accused, 74 NEB. L.
Rav. 804, 814 (1995); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Compara-
tive Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 44 ALA. L. REv. 441, 470 (1997).
220. See Smith, supra note 219, at 475 ("An advantage of the jury that is closely related
to its status as an institution expressing popular sovereignty is the functioning of the jury as
a check on potential governmental abuse."); Harris, supra note 219, at 807 ("Fear of un-
checked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found
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plan of the convention, stating that the "The trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury."
221
The importance of juries in criminal cases was one of the few
things on which the competing factions at the Constitutional Con-
vention agreed. Both Federalist and Anti-Federalist believed that
the trial by jury was one of the best ways to secure the rights of the
people.22 In Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton described this
unanimous support:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if
they agree on nothing else, concur at least in the value they
set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between
them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safe-
guard to liberty, the latter represent it as the very palladium of
free government.
223
The inclusion of the jury as a structural component of Article III
made good sense and fit neatly within the conceived structure of
checks and balances.224 In his book The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction, Professor Amar describes the jury as providing both
an intra-branch check against the arbitrary actions of federal
judges and an inter-branch check against the oppressive conduct of
the other two branches.' Thus, in their role as guardians of liber-
ties, criminal juries were deemed to be part of the Judicial
Branch.2 6
The Framers saw the jury's role as an intra-branch check against
judicial overreaching as similar to the bicameral requirements of
the Legislative Branch.2 7 Contemporaneous writings compared the
expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the de-
termination of guilt or innocence.").
221. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 3.
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961); Amar, supra
note 231, at 84.
223. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 562.
224. See Jonakait, supra note 219, at 26; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968) ("[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a funda-
mental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of un-
checked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found
expression in the criminal law in the this insistence upon community participation in the
determination of guilt or innocence.")
225. See Amar supra note 219, at 87.
226. Id. at 95; see also Barkow, supra note 175, at 57-58; Bruce Antkowiak, The Ascent of
an Ancient Palladium: The Resurgent Importance of Trial by Jury and the Coming Revolution, 13
WIDENER L.J. 11, 30 (2003).
227. Id. at 94-95; see also Jonakait supra note 219, at 24-25 ("Americans [gave] two
rights preeminent importance. If the rights to representation and to trial by jury were left to
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judicial structure to that of the legislature, with an upper house of
greater stability and experience and a lower house to represent
popular sentiment. 22 Analogies between the legislature and juries
abounded. The Federal Farmer wrote:
It is essential in every free country, that the common people
should have a part and a share of influence, in the judicial as
well as in the legislative department.... The trial by jury in
the judicial department, and the collection of people by their
representatives in the legislature ... have procured for them,
in this country, their true proportion of influence, and the
wisest and most fit means of protecting themselves in the
community.2
Just as the bicameral nature of the Legislative Branch was created
as an internal check against legislative overreaching, the jury was
placed in the Judicial Branch to serve a similar check against fed-
eral judges. 3° If judges tried to subvert the laws and change the
forms of government, jurors would check them by deciding against
their opinions and determinations. s' And because juries were the
voice of the people, their pronouncements were presumptively
more legitimate."'
The Framers assumed the intra-branch check was necessary be-
cause federal judges, although protected from political pressures
by Article III's tenure and salary requirements, were, in the end,
government employees. 33 In the words of one Anti-Federalist,
'Judges, unincumbered by juries, have been ever found much bet-
ter friends to the government than to the people."2 ' The Framers
identified the jury as playing a major role in protecting ordinary
citizens against judicial participation in governmental oppres-
sion.235 Jurors would be drawn from the community and were not
permanent government officials on the government payroll. 36 The
operate in full force, they would shelter nearly all the other rights and liberties of the peo-
ple.").
228. Amar, supra note 219, at 95; Barkow, supra note 175, at 57 (observing that the
Framers compared the jury's power to that of a voter).
229. Amar, supra note 219, at 94.
230. SeeJonakait supra note 219, at 26, 27
231. See Amar supra note 219, at 100.
232. SeeJonakait supra note 219, at 28.
233. Id. at 26. "[T]he Constitution did not change human nature; instead, it recognized
it and tried to protect against its excesses." Id.
234. Amar, supra note 219, at 84.
235. Jonakait, supra note 219, at 27.
236. Amar, supra note 219, at 84.
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inclusion of the jury within Article III was a natural outgrowth of
the Framers' experience that judges, acting without juries, would
participate in the oppression of the people.3 7 Ironically, the Booker
constitutional majority recognized that "[tihe Framers of the Con-
stitution understood the threat of 'judicial despotism' that could
arise from 'arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions'
without the benefit of a jury in criminal cases."
23 8
But the jury also served as an inter-branch check against Legisla-
tive and Executive overreaching. It could interpose itself on behalf
of the people's rights by refusing to convict when the executive
sought to abuse its position or when a defendant was charged un-
der any federal law it deemed unconstitutional.2 3 9 As Tocqueville
observed, the overall jury system placed the real direction of soci-
ety in the hands of the people,2 ° or as a more contemporary
observer recently stated,
The jury system proves the wisdom of the Founders in their
utilization of direct democracy to temper the potential ex-
cesses of the only unelected branch of government....
Through the jury, we place the decisions of justice where they
rightly belong in a democratic society: in the hands of the
governed.4
The jury, then, provides an avenue through which the people can
participate in the administration of the law and act as a check
242
against tyranny.
The perception of the jury as a structural check against tyranny
was a natural outgrowth of the Framers' pre-revolutionary experi-
237. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("Those who wrote our constitutions
knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded crimi-
nal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of a
higher authority.")
238. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 753.
239. Amar, supra note 219, at 84; Barkow, supra note 175, at 63-64 (discussing "jury nul-
lification").
240. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 337-339 (Schocken 1st ed.
1961).
241. William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, 50 FED. LAw. 30, 31-32
(2003).
242. See Barkow, supra note 175, at 55-56. During the colonial period, criminal juries
did provide an avenue through which the colonist expressed their disdain for British rule.
Juries objected to the British parliament's Navigation and Revenue Acts by refusing to con-
vict colonists for violation of these statutes. The juries' blatant disregard for imperial law was
not a form of jury nullification but rather the People declaring a law unconstitutional. This
form of local justice arose from the belief that "a jury unwilling to play a subservient role was




ence.13 Before the revolution, the jury played an important role in
preventing the encroachment of British law on individual rights.
2 44
"Colonial juries, then, acted as roadblocks to laws regarded as un-
just and to judges controlled by the executive." 24 5 They made the
enforcement of oppressive English trade and revenue laws nearly
impossible by refusing to convict, and they checked the enforce-
ment of seditious libel laws.246 Thus, the jury was more than an
individual right, it was a way for the people to express their disdain
for laws they deemed unconstitutional. 47
Creating a voice for the people in the Judicial Branch was also
entirely consistent with the Framers' attempts to create a govern-
ment for the people and by the people. 8 The Framers created a
structure in which the Executive and Legislative Branches repre-
sented the people and were accountable to them.249 Given the
Framers' desire to create a system in which the people dominated
the political landscape, it would be odd if they excluded the people
from the Judicial Branch-the only unelected branch, and the
branch that had the ultimate say in "what the law is." 250 Moreover,
any contention that the people were not included in the Judicial
Branch is contradicted by Thomas Jefferson's statement " [w] ere I
called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in
the Legislative or Judicial department, I would say it is better to
leave them out of the Legislative."
251
In the final analysis, Patton is easily discredited. Its reasoning is
stunted and its historical analysis fails to account for the body of
evidence supporting a contrary conclusion. And although Patton's
243. SeeJONAKAIT, supra note 219, at 24-25; Eben Moglen, Consider Zenger: Partisan Poli-
tics and the Legal Profession in Provincial New York, 94 COLUM. L REv. 1520 (1994) ("Thatjuries
provided a constitutional check on executive power was not a lesson any English-speaking
person needed the Zenger case to teach-that was why English people loved juries so
deeply, and why British North Americans were willing to respond with organized civil vio-
lence when jury trial was interfered with by an assertedly sovereign Parliament in the 1760s
and 1770s.").
244. SeeJONAKAIT, supra note 219, at 24-25.
245. See id. at 24.
246. Id.
247. See Reid, supra note 242, at 71;Jonakait, supra note 219, at 24.
248. AMAR, supra note 219, at 94-95. This proposition is supported by Thomas Jeffer-
son's pronouncement that "it is necessary to introduce the people into every department of
government." Id.
249. SeeErler, supra note 219, at 157.
250. SeeMarburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
251. AMAR, supra note 219, at 95 (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to L'Abbe Ar-
noux (July 19, 1789), in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282,283 (Julian P Boyd ed.,
1958)).
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dubious value in contemporary cases appears to be entirely an-
chored to stare decisis, even this precedential value is questionable.
B. Overcoming Patton
In addition to its shaky analytical and historical foundation, Pat-
ton's declaration that the two jury provisions should be interpreted
identically was arguably dicta.252 The question before the Court was
a narrow one: whether a criminal defendant could waive his right
to "a trial and verdict by a constitutional jury of twelve men."253 The
Court could have addressed the constitutional requirement of the
number of jurors without commenting on the structural role of the
jury. Thus, Patton is not an impediment to recognizing the jury as
part of the structural checks and balances.
The Court's decision to delve into the structure of government
appeared to be driven by the defense's argument that a constitu-
tional jury of twelve men was a jurisdictional requirement under
Article III, § 2.254 If, as the defense contended, the numerical com-
position of the jury was a jurisdictional requirement, then a court
was stripped of its jurisdiction if the jury was comprised of a lesser
number.2 55 The Court dismissed this argument and declared that
the jury provision in Article III, § 2 was not jurisdictional.256 It is at
this point that the Court surmised that the Article III and the Sixth
Amendment jury provisions were identical. 257 But even if the
Court's declaration that Article III's jury provision was not jurisdic-
tional is deemed essential to the ultimate holding, the Court's
statement regarding jurisdiction does not undermine the concept
that Article III's jury provision is a structural protection. It only
stands for the proposition that a criminal defendant's decision to
waive his right to a specific number of jurors does not impair the
trial court's jurisdiction.58
252. Id. at 108.
253. Patton, 281 U.S. at 287.
254. Id. at 293.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 298.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 289 ("It must consequently be taken that the word 'jury' and the words 'trial
by jury' were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the meaning
affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in England at the time of the adop-
tion of that instrument; and that when Thompson committed the offence of grand larceny
in the territory of Utah-which was under the complete jurisdiction of the United States for
all purposes of government and legislation-the supreme law of the land required that he
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Despite its protestations to the contrary, the Patton Court's deci-
sion to read Article III and the Sixth Amendment as confluent was
inconsistent with the Court's previous decision in Callan v. Wil-
son.2 19 In Callan, the Court stated that "the [Sixth] amendment was
[not] intended to supplant that part of the third article which re-
lates to trial by jury."2'6 If anything, Callan supports the idea that
Article III can be read separately from the Sixth Amendment. Al-
though the Patton Court quoted this statement to support its
decision to read the two provisions as coterminous, its position had
the exact opposite effect, supplanting Article III's structural pro-
tections with the individual right protected by Sixth Amendment.
61
The jury's structural role in Article III was rendered ineffectual by
the Patton Court's decision.
Patton's progeny does not create an insurmountable obstacle to
re-establishing constitutional equilibrium. The case law that relies
on the decision in Patton does so largely for Patton's declaration
that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial can be waived.262 A
large portion of these cases involve state laws.263 While the Sixth
Amendment has been held applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, the structural protections in Article III
are not incorporated.2 6 Therefore, these cases are inapposite to the
underlying issue of whether the two provisions should be read in
pari materia. At most, they provide insight into the requirements of
the Sixth Amendment. The handful of cases on the federal level
that have relied on Patton to address a sentencing issue have fo-
cused generally on the constitutional elements of a jury trial.265
These cases do not rely on Patton for its discussion regarding the
structural role of the jury.
In the end, Patton does not present a formidable obstacle to ad-
dressing the structural role of the jury. In fact, the Supreme Court
should be tried by a jury composed of not less than twelve persons.") (quoting Thomson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898)).
259. CaUan, 127 U.S. at 540.
260. Id. at 549.
261. Patton, 281 U.S. at 298.
262. See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 33 (1965); Adams v. United States ex
re, McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942); In ir United States, 903 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 271-72 (6th Cir. 1983); Carrion v. Gonzalez, 125
ESupp. 819, 822 (D.PR. 1954).
263. See, e.g., Kirk v. State, 22 So.2d 431, 432-33 (Ala. 1945); Blair v. State, 698 So.2d
1210, 1213 (Fla. 1997); State v. Dunne, 590 A.2d 1144, 1147 (N.J. 1991); State v. McGee, 447
S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. 1969).
264. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
265. See, e.g., Singer, 380 U.S. at 33; Adams, 317 U.S. at 275; United States v. Pachay, 711
F.2d 488, 494 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill, C.J., concurring); Martin, 704 F.2d at 271-72.
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has, on several occasions, acknowledged the important role the
jury plays in checking governmental overreaching.66 Indeed, in
Powers v. Ohio, the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he opportu-
nity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of
justice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifica-
tions for retaining the jury system.267 Thus, in theory, federal courts
are free to treat the jury as a part of the system of checks and bal-
ances.
C. Distinguishing Article III from the Sixth Amendment
Even if one accepts that the jury provisions in Article III and the
Sixth Amendment can be read differently, there still remains the
question of how to distinguish them. Professor Akhil Amar has
proffered one distinction, suggesting that the Article IIIjury clause
was mandatory in nature and the Sixth Amendment was added to
determine from where the jurors would be drawn. 26 According to
this theory, "the clear words of Article III, mandating that 'the trial
of all Crimes ... shall be by Jury,' [are] a command no less manda-
tory and structural than its companion commands that the judicial
power of the United States 'shall be vested in' federal courts
.... ,,269 In contrast, the Sixth Amendment refers to the accused's
rights surrounding the trial by jury. For example, the accused has
the right to an "impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law."270 Professor Amar posits that given
the difference in wording between the amendment and Article III,
"perhaps the special Sixth Amendment right to a jury from the
'district' is solely the accused's, waivable at will-but the underlying
mandate of the jury cannot be waived., 271
While this Article agrees with Professor Amar's premise that the
two jury provisions should be read differently, it advances a slightly
266. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368, 380 (1979); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
267. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406.
268. AMAR, supra note 219, at 107 ("Thus the amendment can indeed be read as adding
something new to Article III without taking anything away from the original mandate [in
Article III]."); see also id. at 105-06 ("Note that, strictly speaking, Article III regulates
venue-where the jurors will sit at trial-rather then vicinage-where the jurors will come
from.").
269. Id. at 104-05.
270. U.S. CONST. Amend. VI; Aa.AR, supra note 219, at 105.
271. AMAR, supra note 219, at 106.
[VOL. 38:2
Compmmising Liberty
different distinction. This Article contends that the reference to
the jury contained in Article III embodies the jury as an institution
of the people. Using the bicameral analogy and the definition of
jury as the democratic branch of the judiciary power, this Article
asserts that the Article III use of 'Jury" is a reference to the peo-
ple's right to participate in the administration of the nation's
criminal laws, thereby providing a structural check against gov-
ernment overreaching.272 In contrast, the Sixth Amendment
specifically explicates the criminal defendant's right to access a
jury. While the individual right to access can be waived, the jury's
structural role cannot.
273
The distinction this Article proffers has two advantages over the
current analytical framework. First, it allows the criminal defendant
to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. This allowance
should allay any visions of criminal defendants being forced into
trial by jury. Second, it recognizes the jury's role in our tripartite
system of government. Contrary to conventional wisdom, recogniz-
ing the jury as part of the system of checks and balances will not
require constitutional reordering. The jury's structural role can be
incorporated into the Court's existing separation of powers analy-
sis.
D. The Jury in the Separation of Powers Analysis
Admittedly, it is difficult to reconcile the apparent discrepancy
between the ability of an accused to waive his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial with an individual's inability to waive the struc-
tural guarantees contained in Article 111.274 The solution to this
puzzle lies in the Supreme Court's separation of powers analysis.
The separation of powers involves both the dispersion and blend-
ing of powers; it was designed to promote liberty by preventing the
accumulation of excessive power in one branch.275 In addressing
separation of powers issues, the Court focuses on whether the chal-
lenged government conduct interferes with the carefully designed
checks and balances intended to prevent the accumulation of
272. Barkow, supra note 175, at 56-57; see also Harris, supra note 219, at 810-11.
273. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986).
274. Cf id.
275. See Martin Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Prag-
matic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DuKE L. J. 449, 457-465 (1991) (discussing
the origins and rationale of the separation of powers theory).
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power.7 6 Any conduct that interferes with this design undermines
the political values it was meant to foster and violates the separa-
277tion of powers.
The Supreme Court addressed the distinction between individ-
ual rights and structural protections when it distinguished between
a litigant's interest in an impartial and independent adjudication
of claims and the structural role of an independent judiciary.7 In
Commodity Future Traders Commission v. Schor, the Court explained
that while a litigant can waive his right to an impartial adjudica-
tion, "to the extent that [the] structural principle is implicated in a
given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional
difficulty., 279 Thus, when Article III structural limitations are at is-
sue, "notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because
the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot
be expected to protect."
280
In determining whether structural principles are implicated in a
given case, the Court looks to whether the conduct at issue imper-
missibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial
Branch. 8' Structural principles can be undermined when Congress
attempts to encroach on the power of the Judicial Branch.8 For
example, in Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., the Court addressed the question whether the judicial
power of the United States could be vested in courts whose judges
do not enjoy the protections and safeguards specified in Article
111.28' The Court determined that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 vio-
lated the separation of powers because the Act withdrew certain
2814
matters from judicial cognizance. As a result, the congressional
276. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996)(stating "separation-of-
powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its consti-
tutional duties"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988) (holding that the Ethics in
Government Act did not impermissibly interfere with the Executive's ability to perform its
constitutionally assigned function to make sure the laws are faithfully executed); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-57 (1983) (concluding that because the one-house veto utilized
to override the Attorney General's discretionary decision that Chadha should not be de-
ported circumvented the constitutional design and impaired the Executive's ability to act as
a check on improvident legislative action, the separation of powers was violated).
277. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA L. REV.
1127, 1147-49 (2000).
278. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986).
279. Id. at 850-51.
280. Id. at 851.
281. Id. at 851-52.
282. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982).




enactment was an unwarranted encroachment upon the judicial
power reserved to Article III courts.285
Structural principles can also be implicated when Congress
impermissibly undermines the role of the Judicial Branch.286 The
Court considered this issue in Schor when it examined whether a
congressional enactment allowing a private litigant to adjudicate a
state law claim in an administrative agency was an impermissible
intrusion on the judiciary's role.287 The Court concluded it was not,
in part because there was a degree of judicial control saved for the
Article III courts. 288 Thus, the structural checks envisioned by the
Framers were untouched.289
The analytical framework adopted in Schor and Marathon can be
referenced to address the role of the jury. Under this framework, a
criminal defendant is free to waive his right to a jury trial, but to
the extent that structural principles are implicated, the waiver is
not dispositive of the lack of a constitutional defect.29 Consistent
with the underlying concerns of the separation of powers analysis
discussed in Schor and Marathon, structural principles are impli-
cated when the jury's role as an intra or inter-branch check on the
accumulation or abuse of power is impaired by government con-
duct.2 9 While obviously a congressional enactment eliminating a
criminal defendant's access to ajury would violate this principle, as
well as the Sixth Amendment, congressional enactments that sys-
tematically discourage an individual from asserting his right to a
jury trial may also implicate structural concerns. Assuming that the
jury plays an important role in the tripartite system of government,
an act of Congress that undermines that role is a violation of the
separation of powers.
285. Id. at 83-84; see also id. at 87 ("We conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed., Supp.
IV), as added by § 241 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissibly removed most, if
not all, of the essential attributes of the judicial power from the Art. III district court, and
has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot be
sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.")
286. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986).
287. Id. at 851.
288. Id. at 855. See also Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court'sJurisdiction Over Due Process Collec-
tion Appeals: Is It Constitutional? 55 BAYLOR L. REv. 453, 484-490 (2003) for an excellent
discussion on the analytical framework developed in Schor.
289. Schor, 478 U.S. at 857; but see id. at 865 (Brennan, J. dissenting) ("If the administra-
tive reparations proceeding is so much more convenient and efficient than litigation in
federal district court that abrogation of Article III's commands is warranted, it seems to me
that complainants would rarely, if ever, choose to go to district court in the first instance.
Thus, any sharing ofjurisdiction is more illusory than real.").
290. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 850.
291. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 275, at 463-64.
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Under this analysis, the federal sentencing guidelines violate the
separation of powers because they interfere with the jury's ability to
perform its constitutionally assigned role. Like the offending con-
gressional enactment in Marathon, the federal sentencing
guidelines threaten the institutional integrity of the Judicial
Branch. Originally, Congress created a sentencing regime that sys-
tematically discouraged criminal defendants from seeking a trial by
jury and placed a significant amount of unchecked power in the
prosecutor's hands. Although the Booker decision may arguably re-
duce the prosecutor's power, it simply transferred that power to the
federal judge. While this transfer of power is comforting to some, it
does not correct the constitutional imbalance. Moreover, under
the Booker analysis, Congress is still free to maintain the institu-
tional incentives that encourage jury waivers. Under either system,
the jury has effectively been removed as a check against govern-
ment overreaching.
IV. RESTORING THE BALANCE
Because the operation of the guidelines-whether in its manda-
tory or discretionary form-implicates structural concerns, a
criminal defendant's decision to waive his right to a jury trial can-
not cure the constitutional defect. The question remains, however,
what can be done to restore the balance? The problem does not
invite an easy solution. The solution must balance the structural
integrity of our system of government with the individual's ability
to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a jury. Any viable solution
must also recognize the political and administrative realities of our
current criminal justice system.
As noted by the Booker decision, Congress will ultimately devise
and install a sentencing system that meets constitutional require-
ments. Congress has the opportunity to succeed where the Booker
Court failed: by creating a sentencing system that includes a role
for the jury. Given the current political climate and the administra-
tive realities of our criminal justice system, two options are likely to
be rejected. It is unlikely that Congress will completely repeal the
federal sentencing guidelines, or even significantly amend them to
eliminate the incentives to plead guilty. In fact, the incentives to
plead guilty, the guideline factors that lead to sentence reductions,
remain constitutionally untouched by the Booker decision. Thus,
Congress is free to reinstitute them as mandatory provisions of the
guidelines. The sentencing guidelines as a whole, and especially
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those provisions that encourage waiver, appear entrenched in our
criminal justice system.292 In any event, the sentencing guidelines
were promulgated to achieve worthy goals.23
It is equally unlikely that serious consideration will be given to
exploring the "dark side" of plea bargains.294 Plea bargains, for bet-
ter or worse, have become a necessary evil.29' Because the new
immigration and drug laws have swelled criminal dockets, the
court system has come to rely heavily on plea bargains to keep the
296
system moving.
Whatever changes Congress ultimately decides to make, they
must reinstate the constitutional equilibrium. To restore the con-
stitutional balance, the jury must be injected into the existing
process. Ironically, the solution that this Article recommends
brings us, in part, back to Blakely. In Blakely, the majority relied on
the jury's role in our constitutional structure to support its position
that the jury should decide any facts essential to the lawful imposi-
tion of a penalty.2 97 Justice Scalia described the jury's function as a
"circuit breaker in the State's machinery of justice."298 Unfortu-
nately, Blakely did not do enough to actually allow the jury to
perform its assigned function. Nonetheless, the majority's reason-
ing moves us towards restoring the constitutional balance.
I believe that equilibrium can be restored by working within the
guideline system. I suggest that we create (for lack of a better
phrase) a "guideline jury system." The imposition of a guideline
jury system would fill the constitutional void created by the current
sentencing regime without destroying its basic premise. With the
jury a part of the guideline structure, the sentencing guidelines
would no longer violate the separation of powers, and the criminal
292. Incentives to plead guilty, including promises of a lighter sentence, were a part of
the criminal justice system pre-guidelines as well. See Fisher, supra note 172, at 967. Thus,
simply removing them from the guidelines will not solve the underlying problem.
293. See Breyer I supra note 58, at 5.
294. See Mazzone, supra note 200, at 872-73. Mazzone revisits plea bargains and suggests
that procedures for entering a guilty plea should be altered to incorporate the public. To
inject the public into the plea process, he suggests "Plea Panels" to review the voluntariness
of pleas.
295. This is not to say that plea bargains should not be carefully scrutinized. See United
States v. Speed Joyeras S.A, 204 F.Supp.2d 412, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (suggesting that the
definition of "coercion" in the plea context needs to be reexamined). However, it is unlikely
that any proposal to eliminate plea bargaining will be considered right now.
296. See Administrative Office of the United States, FederalJudicial Caseload: Recent Trends
1997-2001 at 7 (2002) available at http//www.uscourts.gov/recenttrends200l/20015yr.pdf
(reporting that drug, immigration, and firearm laws are largely responsible for the increase
in criminal cases).
297. Blakey v. Washington, 124 S.Ct 2531, 2539 (2004).
298. Id.
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jury, albeit in a different form, would be reinstated as a viable
check against government overreaching.299
In this system, the guideline jury would decide any fact that
raises or lowers the sentence applicable for the offense of convic-
tion. Because the guideline jury is intended to act as a structural
check, it could not be waived by the parties. Admittedly, this is a
significant deviation from contemporary case law regarding the
criminal jury's role in sentencing."° But up to this point, the vast
majority of case law has only addressed the jury involvement re-
quired by the Sixth Amendment. Jurists and commentators have
focused exclusively on the constitutional implications of sentence
enhancements on a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to ajury trial. I am suggesting that to maintain the checks and bal-
ances in our tripartite system of government, the criminal jury
must play a role in the criminal justice system distinct from the
Sixth Amendment requirements.
A guideline jury would, in form, be a hybrid of a grand jury and
petite criminal jury. It would consist of a rotating panel of citizens
convened for a specified period of time to hear sentencing issues
only. Under this system, a criminal defendant would be free to
plead guilty to the charged offense, or, in the alternative, seek a
criminal jury trial on the alleged criminal conduct. Just as under
the current guideline system, the offense of conviction would re-
sult in a base offense level. The base offense level would combine
with the defendant's criminal history category to yield a sentencing
range. If the defendant and the prosecutor agree with the offense
level, the judge may sentence within that range. If, however, the
prosecutor or the defendant wishes to raise or lower the offense
level based on a fact or facts not part of the offense of conviction,
the information must be submitted to the guideline jury. The two
sides would then have the opportunity to present evidence to the
guideline jury regarding specific circumstances that warrant an in-
crease or a decrease in the base offense level. The burden would
be on the party seeking the increase or reduction to prove the
necessary facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The guideline jury
would then make specific factual findings and, based on those find-
299. Justice Stevens recommended the use of bi-furcated proceedings in his Booker dis-
sent. "Further in many cases, the Government could simply prove additional facts to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt-as it has been doing in some cases since Apprendi-or, the
court could use bifurcated proceedings in which the relevant conduct is proved to a jury
after it has convicted the defendant of the underlying crime." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at
780(Stevens,J., dissenting).
300. As noted, the Supreme Court has been concerned primarily with facts that would
enhance a defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2539.
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ings, the judge would raise or lower the offense level. The new of-
fense level would result in a new sentencing range within which the
judge would then be free to sentence. The judge would still have
the opportunity to depart below the guideline range if she found
there were circumstances deemed "outside the heartland."
Such a system is not without its critics. Justice Breyer, in his dis-
sent in Apprendi v. NewJersey,'0' rejected a system that would require
a jury to make sentencing decisions. According to Justice Breyer,
"[t] here are, to put it simply, far too many potentially relevant sen-
tencing factors to permit submission of all (or even many) of them
to ajury." 302 1 have attempted to address this concern in three ways.
First, the defendant and prosecutors would choose which sentenc-
ing factors they wanted to "prove" or "oppose." The jury would not
be faced with a myriad of factors that they would need to sift
through, only those the parties chose to advance. Thus, the adver-
sarial system would work much the same as it does during the
determination of guilt phase.
Second, the guideline jury, like a grand jury, would serve for a
specified period of time. During their service, the jurors would be
exposed to the sentencing guidelines and educated regarding their
complexities, in much the same way a trial jury is taught the com-
plexities of the RICO statute or patent law.30 3 To the extent that
critics deem the complexities of the sentencing guidelines beyond
the reach of ordinary jurors, their criticism is at best disingenuous
and at worst insulting. Jurors are faced daily with complex and dif-
ficult questions under a variety of federal statutes. Moreover, the
availability of a jury should not turn on the complexity of the un-
derlying statute.
Finally, the judge would have the ability to determine the ulti-
mate sentence and could take other facts into account when
sentencing within the guideline range.
The guideline jury system would have several institutional advan-
tages. First, it would not impair a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. A defendant would still be free to plead guilty
and waive his right to a jury trial on the charged offense. The
criminal defendant's continued ability to waive his right to a jury
trial would alleviate any concerns that protecting the jury's
301. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 446 (2000) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
302. Id. at 557.
303. "We have always trusted juries to sort through complex facts in various areas of the
law." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 781 (StevensJ., dissenting).
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structural role in our system of government would somehow turn
the right into an imperative.
Second, this proposed system would reduce the institutional in-
centives to plead guilty and would level, to a certain extent, the
plea bargain playing field. The guideline jury would act as an inter-
branch check by preventing prosecutors from using the guideline
system to pressure defendants to waive their right to a jury trial.
The parties would no longer be able to negotiate the terms of the
sentence. Any fact that would increase or decrease a sentence
would have to be proven to a guideline jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, rather than by the less stringent preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. This requirement would help lessen the use of
"fact" and "factor" bargaining as well as diminish the potency of
the "relevant conduct" provisions discussed earlier. In addition,
because the structural protections cannot be waived, the parties
could no longer use binding plea agreements to stipulate to a
guideline range or to eliminate certain sentencing factors.
This is not to say that prosecutors would be without incentives to
induce pleas. Charge bargaining, for better or worse, would still go
unchecked. Because motions for substantial assistance are usually
highly confidential, it is unlikely they could be included within the
system. Thus, prosecutors and defendants could still use 5K1 mo-
tions to circumvent the system. In addition, prosecutors and
defendants could agree not to pursue a higher or lower sentence
before the guideline jury as part of the plea bargain process. The
guideline jury system would not prevent such plea bargains. Thus,
a guideline jury would not be a part of every sentencing decision.
But the guideline jury would dramatically alter how the sentencing
guidelines currently operate. While it will not cure all the flaws of
the present system, it offers a significant structural improvement.3
°4
Third, federal judges would retain sentencing discretion. A fed-
eral judge would still be able to exercise her discretion within the
guideline range, and additionally would be able to consider factors
304. Unfortunately, the guideline jury system does not address, at least not directly, the
race and gender disparities that permeate our criminal justice system. SeeJustice Anthony
Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (August 9,
2003) (discussing the racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal justice system); David B.
Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts,
44J.L. & EcoN 285, 308-12 (2001) (finding disparities in the likelihood and magnitude of
downward departures based on race (particularly for African Americans and Hispanic
Americans), gender (i.e., women are more likely to receive departures), citizenship, age,
income level, and education level); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Sentencing Issues Facing the New
Department of Justice, 5 Fed. Sent. Rep. 225, 229 (1993) ("My research with Commissioner
Nagel brought to light the frequent use of substantial assistance motions to cloak leniency
for 'sympathetic' (usually white) defendants.").
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deemed "outside the heartland" when pronouncing a final sen-
tence. When determining the final term of imprisonment, the
judge would also be able to account for the "intangibles" in sen-
305tencing. To be sure, federal judges would no longer be making
the final decision regarding the applicability of "sentencing fac-
tors," but these decisions would still be made within the Judicial
Branch.
Most importantly, the guideline jury system would allow the
people to have a voice in the administration of criminal laws, and
would provide a check against governmental overreaching. Be-
cause the community at large is affected by crime, the community
at large should be a part of the criminal justice process.06 The
guideline jury would provide the people with an opportunity to be
involved in the administration of laws at a critical phase: sentenc-
ing. The proposed system would act as both an inter-branch check
against prosecutorial overreaching, as well as an intra-branch check
against judges signing off on plea agreements with artificial sen-
tences just to clear their dockets or sentencing arbitrarily using
their new found discretion. Lastly, as the incentives to plead guilty
diminish, more criminal defendants may exercise their Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial, thereby increasing the people's
participation at the guilt or innocence phase. In addition, because
the guilt or innocence phase would be separate from sentencing,
criminal juries would not be prejudiced by the presentation of ag-
gravating or mitigating sentencing factors during the criminal
trial. 37
To be sure, there are several disadvantages to this system. A
guideline jury system would delay the imposition of the final sen-
tence in those situations in which the prosecutor or the defendant
decides to seek an enhancement or a reduction in the base offense
level. In certain border districts, this addition of another proce-
dural step could cause significant backlogs. While the delay may
305. See In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). ("Ajudge applies mental
impressions of many tangible and intangible factors when imposing a sentence.")
306. Even the Supreme Court has recognized that jury decisions are a reflection of
community values. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) ("Our opinions have also recognized that data concerning the actions of sentencing
juries, though entitled to less weight than legislative judgments, is a significant and reliable
objective index of contemporary values, because of the jury's intimate involvement in the
case and its function of maintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values and
the penal system.") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
307. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (commenting on the awkward,
and conceivably unfair, position for defendants if the guilt phase and the sentencing factor
phase was combined).
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not be of constitutional proportions because it relates only to the
final term of imprisonment and not to the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence, it would still be a significant problem. One of the benefits
of the current sentencing regime is its certainty. With a guideline
jury system, criminal defendants might have to wait some time to
have their final sentence determined. While they would know the
guideline range for the underlying offense at the time of their
conviction, defendants would have to wait for the case to be heard
by a guideline jury before knowing whether that range would be
increased or decreased.
In addition, the viability of so-called sentencing juries has often
been dismissed because of the administrative costs involved.308 A
guideline jury system would certainly add additional financial costs
to an already overburdened court system. And if, as predicted,
more criminal defendants do exercise their right to a criminal jury
trial, these additional costs and time expenditures would certainly
materialize.
But as William Blackstone argued over 200 years ago, the delays
and inconveniences of the criminal jury are a fair price for free
nations to "pay for their liberty."3 0 9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
rejected efficiency arguments when it comes to maintaining the
integrity of the system of checks and balances .3 1 The Court has
maintained that Congress is not free to undermine the constitu-
tional design "whenever it finds that course expedient."... Or as
Judge Stevens commented when discussing jury fact-finding in his
dissent in Booker, " [t] his may not be the most efficient system imag-
inable, but the Constitution does not permit efficiency to be our
primary concern."3 Thus, even though the guideline jury system
would likely result in additional administrative costs, it would more
importantly provide a mechanism for the jury to perform its consti-
tutionally assigned role in the system of checks and balances.
308. See id, at 557.
309. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 350. Or as Justice Scalia stated in Ap-
prendi "[The jury-trial guarantee] has never been efficient; but it has always been free."
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
310. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,73 (1982).
311. Id.




The Supreme Court's decision in Booker was a significant loss for
proponents of a strong jury system. The jury system has historically
been viewed as a necessary check against government oppression.
Yet, the Booker majority failed to account for the criminal jury's
structural role in our tripartite system of government. Any discus-
sion concerning a revision of the federal sentencing guidelines
must recognize the current system's interference with the criminal
jury's ability to perform its constitutionally assigned role. Congress
created a sentencing regime that systematically discourages crimi-
nal defendants from accessing the jury. As a result, the criminal
jury has all but disappeared as a viable check against arbitrary gov-
ernment conduct. The Supreme Court's decision in Booker does
not abate Congress' ability to interfere with the criminal jury's role.
When the sentencing guidelines are viewed in this manner, and
not solely through the Sixth Amendment lens, it becomes evident
that the sentencing guidelines violate the separation of powers.
To remedy this structural imbalance, the criminal jury must be
injected into the sentencing process. To do so, this Article advo-
cates the creation of a "guideline jury" system that would operate
within the current sentencing regime. A guideline jury system
would allow the people a voice in the administration of the crimi-
nal laws without undermining the worthy goals the guidelines were
meant to promote. While we cannot summarily dismiss arguments
concerning delay and costs associated with the guideline jury sys-
tem, we also cannot continue to ignore the great costs that the
current sentencing guidelines impose on constitutional liberty. En-
suring constitutional freedoms is often a costly endeavor, yet one
that we cannot afford to forgo.
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